Economic Growth and the Role of Human Capital

Byron Ramirez Ph.D.

PUBLISHED:

September 16, 2024

Measuring economic growth allows us to determine whether an economy is expanding, remaining unchanged, or declining. Assessing economic performance, namely economic growth expressed through Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is a common method for evaluating the overall health of an economy. A healthy economy generates jobs and tends to lead to improvements in per capita income and living standards. 


In spite of the COVID-19 pandemic’s adverse effects on productivity, supply chains, and economic output worldwide, the U.S. economy has recovered relatively well during the past couple of years. In 2023, the U.S. economy grew at an average rate of 2.5 percent, indicating modest growth. Although there were some fears of economic decline (and trepidation concerning a potential recession), the U.S. economy has rebounded and created jobs, raising overall economic output. The figure below shows the percent change in real GDP (adjusted for inflation) in the United States during the past six quarters. As we can observe, throughout this time period, the U.S. economy has had positive economic growth.


Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis


Meanwhile, some countries such as Mexico and India have struggled economically, particularly on a GDP per capita basis. So, one might wonder, why has the U.S. economy been able to recover notwithstanding the difficulties of the COVID-19 pandemic? What has enabled the U.S. to remain economically resilient during these past few years? We will explore this a bit later. But first, let’s discuss how the theories behind economic growth have evolved over time. 


Background on the Study of Economic Growth


Economic growth has been studied for several decades. The economist, Robert Solow, became a prominent scholar on the subject in the 1950s. Solow’s theories proposed the role of accumulation of physical capital and emphasized the importance of technological progress as the ultimate driving force behind sustained economic growth. 


Growth theorists in the 1950s argued that technological progress occurred in an unexplained manner, and thus they placed technological growth outside of their economic model. However, there was a significant shortcoming in assuming that long-run economic growth is largely determined by some unexplained rate of technological progress which, after all, could not be modeled. 


By the 1960s, growth theory was based mainly on the neoclassical model, developed by Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), and Koopmans (1965), to name a few. The neoclassical model considered individual consumers and firms and assumed that they make rational choices to maximize their utility or profits, and it also presumed perfect information and zero transaction costs. The neoclassical growth model posited that economic growth results from capital accumulation through household savings. Over time, economists would realize that consumers and decision makers in general are not always rational, markets indeed lack perfect information, and transactions between parties certainly yield costs. 


In the 1980s, most of the research conducted by economists centered on “endogenous growth” theories, in which the long–term economic growth rate was largely assumed to be determined by government policies. As such, economists argued that government policies help to motivate businesses to invest in research and development so they can continue to drive innovation.  Several of the economic models that emerged also began to broaden the definition of capital, and included references to human capital (Lucas 1988; Rebelo 1991; Romer 1986). Moreover, another key assumption of the endogenous growth theory is that economic growth is principally the result of internal forces, rather than external ones. 


In the late 1980s and early 1990s, scholarly works began to posit that technological progress generated by the discovery of new ideas was the only way to avoid diminishing returns in the long run. Two professors from the University of Chicago, Paul Romer and Robert Lucas, introduced the notion of “ideas” and of “human capital” as variables that have influence on economic growth. From their research emerged the subfield – the economics of technology. In their ensuing models, the purposive behavior that underlay innovations hinged on the prospect of monopoly profits, which provided individual incentives to carry out costly research (Aghion and Hewitt 1992; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Romer 1990).


Economists’ earlier theories about economic growth had suggested that labor and physical capital and increased productivity from technology are the primary factors that contribute towards economic growth. Over time, however, economists recognized the challenges of achieving economic growth especially as there are diminishing returns to capital and labor, combined with the reality that some countries are not as efficient in their allocation of resources as suggested by the neoclassical growth model.  Consequently, Robert Lucas (1988) and Paul Romer (1994) as well as others (Barro 1997; Rebelo 1991; Sachs and Warner 1997) proceeded to advance ‘Endogenous Growth Theory’ by arguing that economic growth can be driven by human capital, namely by the expansion of skills and knowledge that make workers productive. Thus, they argued that human capital has increasing returns to scale (i.e., the output increases by a larger proportion than the increase in inputs).   


The Influence of Human Capital on the Economy 


For some time now, there has been growing research on the impact of human capital on the economy. A study conducted by the Centre for Economics and Business Research in 2016 indicated that human capital is nearly 2.5 times more valuable to the economy than physical assets such as technology, real estate and inventory. The study also highlighted that for every $1 invested in human capital, $11.39 is added to GDP (CEBR, 2016). This study underscored the important role human capital plays in driving economic growth. When human capital increases in a society, including in areas such as education, science, manufacturing, and management, it leads to increases in innovation, increased productivity, and improved rates of labor force participation, all of which support economic growth.


And so, we come back to the questions: Why has the U.S. economy been able to recover notwithstanding the difficulties of the pandemic? What has enabled the U.S. to remain economically resilient during these past few years? I argue that the United States has been able to withstand the adverse effects of the pandemic due to its sizable stock of human capital. Since the U.S. is a high-income country with a workforce that has relatively high levels of education and health (on average), it tends to develop human capital at a higher rate (relative to other countries), enabling it to contend with economic adversity through innovation driven by knowledge workers. Below is a graph using data from the World Bank which shows the relationship between the Human Capital Index (Note: HCI is comprised of education and health components), and GDP per capita. As we can see from the graph, the United States has a high HCI score (0.7) and a high level of GDP per capita (slightly above USD$60,000). 


Source: Our World in Data, 2024


Key Lessons 


The Human Capital Index, developed by the World Bank, conveys the productivity of the next generation of workers compared to a benchmark of complete education and full health (World Bank, 2024). The HCI measures the knowledge, skills, and health that a child can expect to accumulate during their youth, taking into account factors such as education, health, and survival rates. The index is devised to indicate how improvements in health and education outcomes can lead to considerably greater productivity of the next generation of workers. Higher values indicate higher expected human capital. The United States’ relatively high HCI index score of 0.7 as of the year 2020, indicates that the country had made investments in human capital. A country's HCI score is its distance to the “frontier” of complete education and full health. Based on this index score, a child born in the United States will be 70 percent as productive when she grows up as she could be if she enjoyed complete education and full health.  In other words, the future earnings potential of children born will be 70% of what they could have been with complete education and full health. 


Unlike physical capital, human capital has increasing rates of return. Therefore, economic growth is augmented at a larger rate as human capital accumulates (people acquire more knowledge and skills). If human capital is indeed nearly 2.5 times more valuable to the economy than physical assets, then economies (nations) ought to invest in those areas that support human capital, namely education and health. And if investing $1 in human capital yields an estimated $11.39 to GDP, then countries will benefit greatly from investing in improving the health and education of people. 

Nations that invest in human capital are more adept at developing innovations that improve efficiency, competitiveness, and productivity. Human capital is also a key input in the research sector, which develops and incubates new ideas that support technological progress and innovation. Moreover, investing in education is intricately connected with the development of human capital and economic development (Barro and Lee 1993; Romer 1993). Hence, an increase in the educational attainment level of the population will, in turn, yield knowledge spillover effects which spur innovation across different industries and sectors.  And at the aggregate level, innovation will produce the long-term effect of increasing the economic growth rate. 


Innovation led by human capital (skilled knowledge workers) provides productivity gains that allow firms to expand their size, market reach and profits. Human capital also contributes to the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations within the social and public sectors.  In all, investing in human capital is beneficial to the well-being of the economy and society in general. Enhancing the education and health of people is essential to developing human capital and economic resilience. The acquisition of skills and knowledge enable ‘knowledge workers’ to drive entrepreneurial activities and innovation, proving that human capital is indeed the most important factor to developing a resilient economy and a functioning society. 

References

Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992). A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction. Econometrica, 60, 323-351.

Barro, R. (1997). Determinants of economic growth: a cross-country empirical study (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Barro, R. J., & Lee, J. W. (1993). International comparisons of educational attainment. Journal of monetary economics, 32(3), 363-394.

Centre for Economics and Business Research. (2016). Korn Ferry Economic Analysis: Human Capital. 

Data Page: Human Capital Index. Our World in Data (2024). Data adapted from World Bank. Retrieved from https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/human-capital-index-in-2020 [online resource]

Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991). Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Koopmans, T.C. (1965). On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth. In: Johansen, J., Ed., The Econometric Approach to Development Planning, North Holland, Amsterdam.

Lucas, R. E. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 2, 3-42.

Ramsey, F.P. (1928). A Mathematical Theory of Saving. Economic Journal, 38, 543-559.

Rebelo, S. (1991). Long-run policy analysis and long-run growth. Journal of Political Economy. IC, 500-521.

Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth, Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-1037, October.

Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous Growth and Technical Change, Journal of Political Economy, 99, pp. 807-827.

Romer, P. M. (1993). Idea gaps and object gaps in economic development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), 543-573.

Romer, P. M. (1994). The origins of endogenous growth. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3-22.

Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1997). Fundamental sources of long-run growth. The American Economic Review, 184-188.

Solow, R. M. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 70(1), pages 65-94.

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. (2024). Gross Domestic Product. Retrieved from: https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product [online resource]

World Bank. (2024) World Bank Group launches Human Capital Index (HCI). Retrieved from: https://timeline.worldbank.org/en/timeline/eventdetail/3336  [online resource]



By Karen Linkletter, Ph.D. August 20, 2025
Previously, I shared de Tocqueville’s concept of equality of condition and how it is manifesting in today’s perception that democracy has failed to deliver on its promise of economic and social equality for all. Promises of economic equality are impossible to fulfill; but democratic societies can and should offer all of their members dignity and a sense of purpose. In this final installment, I’ll share de Tocqueville’s prescriptions for shoring up the institutions of a democratic society – as well as some of his warnings about challenges that democracies face. Tendency Towards Strong Authority According to de Tocqueville, the love of equality found in democracies leads to a tendency towards favoring strong, centralized governmental power. As conditions become more equal, “individuals seem of less and society of greater importance” (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 290). This leads to what he refers to as “uniformity of legislation”: the belief that laws and rules should be applied uniformly to everyone across society. Nuance and complexity are lost, and individual difference is subsumed to a concept akin to Rousseau’s General Will (which Drucker treated with the utmost disdain). The United States that de Tocqueville visited was still relatively rural and homogenous in 1830, but there certainly were tensions brewing with respect to slavery, the role of women in society, and the balance between manufacturing and agriculture in the economy. Today, the United States at times stresses the importance of strong federal power, usually to assert law and order or negotiate with other sovereign nations, but at other times lauds the role of individuals having a voice in state and local matters, such as educational curriculum and budgetary control. This tension between the desire for central authority and states’ rights has a long history and continues to impact legislative and other matters. Role of the Judiciary De Tocqueville holds up the Constitution as an exemplary system of checks and balances to counter this tendency towards the power of the “despotic majority.” James Madison famously warned of “tyranny of the majority” in his Federalist Paper Number 10. De Tocqueville favored the system of federalism, which limited the powers of the federal government to those functions that were best suited to a central power and delegated the rest to the states. He stated that this allowed “the Union to combine the power of a great republic with the security of a small one” (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 299). De Tocqueville was particularly impressed with the power given to the judiciary in the United States. He wrote extensively on our system of trial by jury, arguing that serving on a jury was a form of legal education for everyday people, and thus an important part of understanding the workings of the legal process enshrined in the Constitution. The judiciary, he said, “check and direct the impulses of the majority without stopping its activity” (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 299). The role of the courts in the United States today is under challenge. Recent Supreme Court decisions have ceded the power of that body over the executive branch (see Trump v. CASA and Trump v. United States). However, federal courts continue to function to “check and direct” questionable actions through injunctions. Globally, an independent judiciary is seen as crucial to counter rising authoritarianism (Satterthwaite, 2022). The Art of Association Alexis de Tocqueville was fascinated by Americans’ affinity for local action. As a member of the French aristocracy, this was completely foreign to him. He observed Americans participating in local government, clubs, religious congregations, and reform organizations. He used New England as a model, remarking that the system instituted under Puritan rule (which involved self-government and autonomy) fostered a strong sense of local activism: “The New Englander is attached to his township not so much because he was born in it, but because it is a free and strong community, of which he is a member, and which deserves the care spent in managing it” (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 66). Because local action bonded people to one another (in Drucker’s words, provided status and function), they feel a sense of purpose. This “art of association” that Americans demonstrated to de Tocqueville countered the tendency towards negative individualism and the despotism of the majority that he feared. Many authors have documented the increasing atomization of society and subsequent loss of social mixing that was the hallmark of American public life (see Galbraith, The Affluent Society, Putnam, Bowling Alone, and Bishop, The Big Sort). The rise of social media has only increased this tendency. To counter this reality, radio and television commentator Michael Smerconish created “The Mingle Project”, a series of events bringing diverse groups of people together to discuss topics of interest. Free Press De Tocqueville is well-known for advocating for a free press. It is, in fact, one of his core tenants of a functioning democracy: “to suppose that they [newspapers] only serve to protect freedom would be to diminish their importance: they maintain civilization” (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 111). While he acknowledges the existence of “junk news”, he argues that there is much more good information than bad. De Tocqueville was particularly impressed with the wide range and number of newspapers available, particular smaller news outlets. As the primary information source of that era, newspapers allowed people to not only stay current on politics, but also to know of events they could attend. Perhaps most importantly, a free and diverse press sheds light on government, creating yet another possible guardrail against abuses of power. There is substantial research on the impact of declining local news, showing that it contributes to political polarization, lack of voter engagement, and reduced accountability in the public sector (see The state of local news and why it matters, American Journalism Project, https://www.theajp.org/news-insights/the-state-of-local-news-and-why-it-matters/). Declining circulation and advertising revenues have resulted in the closure of thousands of local media outlets despite the fact that most Americans have positive impressions of local journalists. Furthermore, fewer Americans are paying attention to local news, and the majority prefer to get their news from online forums such as Facebook or Nextdoor (Shearer et al., 2024). De Tocqueville’s Warnings It is clear that de Tocqueville saw rule of law, vibrant local organizations, and a healthy fourth estate as counterbalances to the tendency towards despotic rule by the majority and centralized power in democracies. He furthermore warned against two specific threats to democracy: capitalism’s ability to create a permanent social underclass, and citizen apathy. A Manufacturing Aristocracy In 1830, America’s economy was beginning its transition from one based on agriculture to one driven by industry. That transition would accelerate after the Civil War, but de Tocqueville remarked on the transformation that he saw during his visit. He was most concerned, however, with industrialization’s impact on society. As manufacturing became more specialized and routinized, the work itself became more mundane and unfulfilling; de Tocqueville describes to a tee what Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels would a decade or so later describe as “alienation of labor”: “as the workman improves, the man is degraded” (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 158). Spending twenty years “making heads for pins” leaves the worker no room to exercise any curiosity or intelligence; instead, the worker is assigned “a certain place in society, beyond which he cannot go” (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 159). At the same time, manufacturing “raises the class of masters” to the point where worker and owner have nothing in common. Each fill a position that is fixed, and they are dependent upon each other. This, de Tocqueville argues, is an aristocracy. The creation of a “permanent inequality of conditions”, he claims, would spell the demise of democracy. History has shown his analysis to be sound. The Work of Democracy De Tocqueville described the slow delegation of decision making over everyday events from the individual to the state. People, he said, had two conflicting desires: “the want to be led, and they wish to remain free.” In order to fulfill both of these desires, they elect governments democratically but then surrender to “administrative despotism” in the form of rules and regulations that slowly erode individual decision making over matters (Tocqueville, 1835, p. 319). This is another byproduct of equality of conditions; if everyone is the same, then rules can apply to every aspect of life without considering individual circumstances. But of course, this is not the case, and so expanding limitations on judgment, de Tocqueville argues, reduces the ability of democratic citizens to think for themselves. In essence, he is warning that democratic governance requires engagement, involvement, and faith in people’s ability to govern themselves. Otherwise, democracies will simply become administrative tyrannies where the tyrants are duly elected. Conclusion Benjamin Franklin famously responded, when asked what kind of government the Constitutional Convention had created, “A Republic, if you can keep it.” His comment captures the fragility of this form of government, and the responsibilities it construes on its citizens. Alexis de Tocqueville’s observations and warnings send a similar message to us. We have a responsibility to ensure that fair-minded journalism, judicial equity and oversight, and meaningful social and civic engagement are part and parcel of our democratic system of governance. If we fail to pay attention to the warnings from those who were closest to the early stages of democracy’s development, we stand a fair chance to lose what we have been bequeathed. Sources Bishop, B. (2008). The big sort: Why the clustering of like-minded America is tearing us apart. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Galbraith, J.K. (1958). The affluent society. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Satterthwaite, M. (2022). The role of an independent judiciary in protecting rule of law. Asia Pacific Justice Forum, World Justice Project, Dec. 8-9, https://worldjusticeproject.org/news/role-independent-judiciary-protecting-rule-law. Shearer, E. et al. (2024). Americans’ changing relationship with local news. Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/05/07/americans-changing-relationship-with-local-news/. Tocqueville, A.D. and Reeve, H. (1835). Democracy in America. London: Saunders and Otley, to 1840.
By Byron Ramirez Ph.D. July 5, 2025
Over the past two decades, there has been a discernible shift in the professional workforce. Increasingly, individuals have chosen to leave traditional corporate environments in favor of smaller ventures, entrepreneurial efforts, and purpose-driven careers. This migration has been fueled by a desire for greater autonomy, meaningful impact, and freedom from the rigidity of hierarchical organizational structures. As the world continues to undergo sweeping changes—economic, technological, and social—professionals are finding themselves at a crossroads. The COVID-19 pandemic only accelerated this reckoning, forcing people across industries to reevaluate their relationship with work, identity, and independence. The professional exodus from corporate life is not a recent phenomenon, but it has intensified in recent years. Many highly skilled workers have become disenchanted with the often impersonal, bureaucratic nature of large institutions. For them, entrepreneurship and freelance work offer not only flexibility but a deeper connection to their values and aspirations. As Peter Drucker once noted, “People in any organization are always attached to the obsolete” (Drucker, 1999). Drucker was warning leaders of the dangers of complacency, yet his observation applies equally to workers who find themselves trapped in stale roles. The increasing appeal of non-traditional career paths stems from the recognition that fulfillment often comes from impact and ownership—not just a paycheck or job title. The rise of the gig economy and remote work culture further legitimized this shift. Platforms like Upwork and Substack enabled professionals to monetize their expertise without needing corporate infrastructure. Indeed, even before the pandemic, scholars observed a growing "entrepreneurial revolution" in the workforce, driven by digital tools that made self-employment more accessible than ever before (Kuratko et al., 2015). For professionals seeking meaning and control, starting their own ventures or joining mission-driven startups has been an increasingly viable—and attractive—alternative. Then came COVID-19, a global shock that radically disrupted labor markets and workplace norms. Millions were sent home from their offices overnight. What was initially a crisis turned into a catalyst for reevaluation. Working from home blurred the lines between professional and personal life, giving people more agency over their schedules and environments. Freed from long commutes and office politics, many professionals found a renewed sense of balance, albeit under challenging global conditions. However, the post-pandemic “return to normal” did not unfold as many employers had expected. Calls to return to the office were met with resistance, skepticism, and in some cases, outright refusal. Workers had experienced an alternative mode of professional life—one where they could maintain productivity while also caring for families, managing personal responsibilities, and safeguarding their mental health. This prompted many to ask, “What is the value of my independence?” and “Is it worth it, professionally and personally, to return to a traditional office setting?” These questions are not merely emotional—they are deeply strategic. As professionals assess the opportunity costs of returning to office-based roles, they are evaluating more than logistics. They are reconsidering their identities, long-term goals, and the environments in which they thrive. The desire for autonomy is no longer a fringe sentiment; it is becoming mainstream. Research has found that flexibility in where and when people work is now one of the top three factors employees consider when evaluating job opportunities. In essence, the pandemic has recalibrated professional expectations. But this inflection point is compounded by another seismic force: the rapid advancement of technology, particularly automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI). Organizations are investing heavily in these tools, not only to increase efficiency but to future-proof their operations in the face of economic uncertainty and global competition. According to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), we have entered a "Second Machine Age" in which intelligent systems will increasingly complement or even replace human labor in areas once thought to be uniquely human—such as decision-making, language processing, and customer service. The implications for professional workers are profound. Some roles will be augmented by AI, while others may become obsolete. New positions will emerge that require a different blend of technical acumen and human-centric skills such as creativity, empathy, and systems thinking. Professionals will need to engage in continuous learning and adaptation—a concept Drucker repeatedly emphasized. In his view, “the most important contribution management needs to make in the 21st century is...to increase the productivity of knowledge work and knowledge workers” (Drucker, 1999). If organizations are to remain competitive and workers are to remain relevant, both must embrace lifelong learning and agility. However, the technological evolution also raises existential questions: If machines can do our jobs better, faster, and cheaper, what role is left for the human professional? This challenge is not just about economics or efficiency—it is about identity. For many, work is deeply intertwined with self-worth and social contribution. As technology disrupts established career paths, professionals are grappling with how to redefine themselves in a world where expertise alone may no longer guarantee stability or status. This is where the human elements of autonomy, purpose, and adaptability come to the forefront. Drucker argued that in times of great change, continuity must be preserved—not by clinging to the past, but by reaffirming values and mission. “The greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence—it is to act with yesterday’s logic” (Drucker, 1980). For professionals today, yesterday’s logic might mean chasing promotions, adhering to outdated career ladders, or subordinating personal needs to corporate loyalty. But these paradigms are eroding, and a new model is emerging—one that emphasizes contribution over conformity. Balancing continuity and change is especially difficult now, as traditional structures crumble and new models have yet to fully coalesce. Work-life balance, once a fringe discussion, is now central to workforce planning and professional decision-making. Yet as personal agency expands, so too does the burden of choice. The options are plentiful—remote roles, fractional work, entrepreneurship, consulting—but each path requires trade-offs in terms of income security, community, and long-term stability. Management scholars like Mintzberg (2009) have long argued that human development—not just economic output—should be the goal of management. In this light, the current workforce shift is not just a labor trend, but a broader cultural movement. Professionals are asking, “How can I live a good life?” not simply, “How can I make a living?” And companies, if they wish to retain top talent, must begin to answer that question too. Moreover, as technology and autonomy redefine the contours of work, leadership itself must evolve. Traditional command-and-control models are ill-suited for managing decentralized, empowered teams. Leaders must instead become facilitators of meaning, culture, and collaboration. As Goleman (2000) demonstrated, emotional intelligence—self-awareness, empathy, and social skill—is now as important as technical ability in driving team performance and retention. The shift toward purpose-driven work, coupled with the rise of distributed teams, demands a new kind of leadership—one that is human-centered and responsive. We are witnessing a great professional recalibration—a deep and ongoing reexamination of what work means, how it is structured, and what it should achieve. The convergence of post-pandemic recovery, technological disruption, and rising demand for autonomy has created both anxiety and opportunity. Professionals are no longer passively accepting predefined roles; they are actively shaping their careers to align with their values, lifestyles, and aspirations. As Drucker predicted, the most successful organizations—and individuals—will be those who embrace both change and continuity, leveraging technology while preserving the human essence of work. The road ahead is uncertain, but one thing is clear: the age of the autonomous professional is here, and it is reshaping the world of work as we know it. References Brynjolfsson, E., & McAfee, A. (2014). The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. W. W. Norton & Company. Drucker, P. F. (1999). Management Challenges for the 21st Century. Harper Business. Drucker, P. F. (1980). Managing in Turbulent Times. Harper & Row. Goleman, D. (2000). Leadership That Gets Results. Harvard Business Review, 78(2), 78–90. Kuratko, D. F., Morris, M. H., & Schindehutte, M. (2015). Understanding the dynamics of entrepreneurship through framework approaches. Small Business Economics, 45(1), 1–13. Mintzberg, H. (2009). Managing. Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
By Karen Linkletter Ph.D. June 21, 2025
In Part I of this series, I gave a brief overview of Alexis de Tocqueville’s background and project of evaluating American Democracy in the early 19 th century. In this new installment, I’d like to share de Tocqueville’s observations about the nature of equality in America and how what he saw might help us understand some of the challenges democracies face today. When de Tocqueville visited America in 1830-1831, the young nation was in the process of redefining equality both in social and political terms. As I noted earlier, the election of Andrew Jackson as president coincided with the expansion of suffrage to not just propertied white males, but to virtually all free white men. This was because as time passed from the founding of the nation in 1789, large property holdings were broken up and passed onto heirs (something de Tocqueville himself noted). In the younger frontier states, and even in the original colonies, governance required broader participation of the electorate. When the founders crafted the United States’ Constitution, they did not envision a democracy that involved a citizenry of the majority (and certainly not women or people of color). While de Tocqueville has much to say about the political conditions in America, it is his commentary on the social ramifications of this changing nature of equality that is most fascinating (and, perhaps, particularly instructive for us today). As wealth was distributed from the few to the many, the concept of a wealthy propertied class began to fade away. This development was exacerbated by the growth in early industry in the East (notably textile manufacturing) which fueled a rising middle class in the cities. As de Tocqueville notes, the early landed gentry families had all but disappeared as their children became doctors, merchants, and lawyers, “commingled with the general mass.” As a result, he comments, Americans embraced a “middling standard” with respect to education and social station. We continue to see echoes of this as most Americans today would claim to be “middle class” even though it is statistically impossible for everyone to be in the “middle.” Throughout his Democracy in America, de Tocqueville argues that the democratic obsession with equality has dramatic social and cultural consequences. What de Tocqueville refers to as “equality of condition” is not actual equality, but the belief in its primacy as an organizing principle for society. The concept of a meritocracy, where one rises or falls by one’s own efforts rather than by virtue of birth status or family heritage, was increasingly part of American culture by the 1830s; the concept of the “self-made man” was enshrined in popular culture from Benjamin Franklin’s work through the Horatio Alger stories of the 19 th century. De Tocqueville observed that this insistence on self-making, on individual achievement, rips at the social fabric of relationships and interconnectedness. Individualism leads a person to “sever himself from the mass of his fellows” and leave “society at large to itself” (98). As one can no longer distinguish oneself in society by position or family status, one must now achieve individual success or power in order to ‘be someone’. This is a byproduct of equality of condition, because as de Tocqueville argues, no person really wants to be the same as everyone else. Deep down, no one truly desires absolute equality on a social level. The question is: how does someone achieve, in Drucker’s terms, status and function if the old order of aristocracy and class structure is swept away? That was one of the primary questions that De Tocqueville pondered as he studied the emerging American Democracy of the early 1800s. One of the manifestations of the desire for status and function in a society obsessed with equality of conditions is an increasing focus on material success. De Tocqueville was fascinated by the “restlessness” with which Americans lived in such prosperity. This is one of my favorite passages from Democracy in America: In the United States a man builds a house in which to spend his old age, and he sells it before the roof is on; he plants a garden and lets it just as the trees are coming into bearing; he brings a field into tillage and leaves other men to gather the crops; he embraces a profession and gives it up; he settles in a place, which he soon afterwards leaves to carry his changeable longings elsewhere. If his private affairs leave him any leisure, he instantly plunges into the vortex of politics; and if at the end of a year of unremitting labor he finds he has a few days’ vacation, his eager curiosity whirls him over the vast extent of the United States, and he will travel fifteen hundred miles in a few days to shake off his happiness. Death at length overtakes him, but it is before he is weary of his bootless chase of that complete felicity which forever escapes him. De Tocqueville describes what we have, in various periods of time, called “keeping up with the Joneses” or “keeping pace” – the desire to match or supersede others’ social status and lifestyles. When the old systems of class stratification disappear, economic success often becomes a marker of achievement in democratic societies. This leads to not just consumerism, but also the “disquietude” that De Tocqueville noticed. Nothing is ever good enough, because one is always measuring oneself against the prosperity of neighbors, co-workers, and associates. Time is short, and “anxiety, fear, and regret” occupy the mind as we worry about what we are missing out on and what we haven’t achieved. As we think about current modern democratic societies, we can see how this obsession with equality of condition and its associated pressures on the need for status and function have only become more exaggerated. De Tocqueville’s work paved the way for Drucker’s argument against an “Economic Man”: a promise of equality based on either a capitalist or socialist system. Socioeconomic equality is not only impossible; it runs against human nature. Furthermore, Drucker’s theory of a knowledge society, a society based on education and knowledge as capital, makes this even more complicated. The more educated people not only make more money, but they also wield more influence politically and socially. Drucker saw this as early as the 1950s, but it is more obvious today. Now, democratic societies face the perception of an elite ruling class in government, academia, business, and other institutions. The “us” vs. “them” mentality pits this elite class against “the middle” – the average person who feels neglected and missing out, “weary of his bootless chase.” Because we have embraced equality as a passion, democracies are perceived as failures in their ability to uphold the promise of economic and social equality for all. The result is a global rise in populism, a rage against the elite establishment, and a desire to tear down institutions. We have seen this play out in political developments in Poland, Italy, Germany, and the United States. What is the solution to this predicament? Should we not pursue equality? Drucker made the case that free societies needed to provide avenues for status and function for all of its members, which meant that economic success and educational achievement could not be the only avenues for being part of society. If a portion of society sees itself as outcasts, as unable to ‘be someone’ or contribute meaningfully, they will perceive that democratic institutions have failed them. The only way for democratic societies to function is to uphold some faith in equality of condition for all. Once the belief in fundamental principles is lost, there is little glue to hold societies together. The key is how we define “equality”; as Drucker and de Tocqueville showed us, promises of economic equality are destined for failure. But democratic societies can afford all of its members human dignity and a sense of purpose. In the next installment, I’ll provide some of de Tocqueville’s suggestions for strengthening democratic institutions. Sources Tocqueville, A.D. and Reeve, H. (1835). Democracy in America. London: Saunders and Otley, to 1840.
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