The Drucker Difference

William A. Cohen, Ph.D.

PUBLISHED:

May 2, 2024

The Executive PhD program that Peter Drucker, “the Father of Modern Management,” and his dean, Paul Albrecht, developed at Claremont Graduate University in 1975 was the first accredited PhD intended for future top executives. According to Albrecht, this PhD taught the “Drucker Difference” for those “with top management potential.” It was and is expensive.


There were only ten students in the first cohort, and only one of the ten completed the program. This individual eventually rose to the rank of major general in the U.S. Air Force, and, after retirement, founded The California Institute of Advanced Management with Minglo Shao, a Chinese billionaire who had earlier founded Drucker Academies across China. Others graduated in later cohorts and became senior corporate executives, presidents of colleges and universities, and entrepreneurs. 


Was Drucker Really Different?

Most professors built their careers on conventional research and publication in academic journals. Drucker didn’t. His numerous articles were written for practitioners, not primarily researchers. They appeared in the Harvard Business Review, the Wall Street Journal and other journals read primarily by practitioners. In June 2004, Harvard Business Review honored Drucker  with his seventh McKinsey Award for his article, "What Makes an Effective Executive. 


Drucker’s 39 books were written for practitioners as well. They won and received numerous accolades. Yet Drucker did not write synthetic research typical in academia, where one or more hypotheses based on multiple inputs are tested for significant differences. 


Drucker used a different research model. He declared, “corporations are my laboratories.” His conclusions from observation are the basis of the Drucker Difference. They were explained first by Einstein who used the method and explained it in an article in the London Times.


Drucker’s Research Model

Asked in class where he got his vast knowledge and extensive experience to help organizations in so many different industries, Drucker answered: “I have no vast knowledge nor extensive experience on any specific topic. I have only ignorance and lack of experience. Therefore, all I can do is to ask questions. Clients have the knowledge and experience which I lack; they are the real experts on the topics they hire me for.” 


He then gave examples of his questions, beginning with “What business are you in?” “Who is your customer” “What does your customer value? “What are your objectives” and “What is your plan for getting those results?” 


Other Questions

General Electric’s former CEO Jack Welch, who retired with the largest retirement package ever awarded, significantly increased GE’s wealth. He credited Drucker’s consulting. Welch said that Drucker had asked him two questions: “If you have a choice, which GE businesses would you discard?” and “If this is true, what are you going to do about it?” 


Welch explained that he made the decision to sell or liquidate even profitable GE businesses, which were not number one or two in their markets and were unlikely to attain these positions. He used the funds to invest in businesses with better potential.  Over nine years this increased GE’s wealth by 4000 percent. This became known as Drucker’s Abandonment Theory.


Another former client explained: “Drucker got us thinking through our problems and applying our own knowledge and experience in a way we had never considered previously. This was amazingly effective, and we found solutions to our problems with his guidance that we had overlooked.” 


Drucker was Different 

Here was an expert who not only did not claim special talents but rejected the title “guru.” Drucker made no claim as being an extraordinary management researcher. When not at the university, Drucker used his home as his office. He practiced without a staff or even a secretary. He even answered his own phone. He did not claim any special expertise or experience. Yet he reportedly received as much as $10,000 for a few hours work. Few complained. He taught a simple procedure to students. It began with defining the problem and determining the relevant factors including facts, estimates, speculations, assumptions, time available and financial limitations. Only then did he advise clients to identify, discuss, compare, and analyze possible solutions.


Strategy, not Formulae

Drucker refused to develop strategy by formula. There was no BCG nor GE/McKinsey chart with cash cows or dogs. He believed that each situation was so unique, that a manager must know as much as possible to determine strategy. There was no common element of identical importance for all situations. What was decisive and important in one situation might be totally unimportant in another. 


Decisive elements might not even be quantitative or directly associated with profit. While profitability was deemed as necessary to a business as oxygen to breathing, he said that profit maximization was not, and noted that transistor radios were developed in the U.S., but lost the market to the Japanese because American developers tried to maximize profit. Drucker described management as a liberal art and suggested that liberal arts should be employed in developing strategies and management decisions. He noted economics, ethics, history, humanities, philosophy, social science, physical sciences, and psychology, as all being useful in a variety of managerial and business situations. He noted that in addition to external knowledge, self-knowledge of the organization and its people and available resources might be of even greater importance. 


Drucker also wrote that 50% of the outcome of any project was due to its leadership. Once invited by an organization to explain the latest leadership techniques, he rejected the opportunity with the explanation that the latest techniques were known to the ancients and recommended that his inquirer read “the first systematic book on leadership and still the best” which had been written 2000 years earlier by Xenophon, an ancient Grecian general and author.


Drucker and Research 

Most controversial was Drucker’s approach to research, yet it was also employed by Einstein who’d been a researcher in theoretical physics.


In the single year, 1905, Einstein produced four papers, winning the Nobel Prize for theoretical physics. All four were written a year after earning his PhD at the University of Zurich while he was working at the only job he could obtain: as Assistant Patent Examiner in the Swiss Patent Office in Bern. Like Drucker, he had no conventional laboratory or computers.


The Theory of Relativity

Einstein himself described the development of one of his most famous theories, the Theory of Relativity. He imagined himself traveling along side of a moving beam of light. Einstein may have provided Drucker with ideas of research. Drucker observed people in companies in action as Einstein had observed his imaginary beam of light. He used analysis and development of what he observed to develop his theories of management.


Einstein Reveals His Research Methodology 

Einstein described his research methodology in an article in the London Times in 1919, discussing what he called his “Theories of Principle.” Einstein wrote “these theories employ the analytical, not the synthetic method of research. Their starting-point and foundation are not hypothetical components, but empirically observed general properties of phenomena, principles from which mathematical formulae are deduced of such a kind that they apply to every case which presents itself.” 


Synthetic research is what most use in research. It starts with the known and proceeds to the unknown, beginning with a hypothesis or hypotheses. It then tests these hypotheses by proving or disproving each usually by examination of a sufficient number of examples and testing mathematically for significant differences.  Einstein’s analytical research starts with the unknown and proceeds to the known. There is no hypothesis. One definition of analytical research is “a specific type of research that involves critical thinking skills and the evaluation of facts and information relative to the research being conducted.” This analytical process is how Drucker arrived at his theories and is part of the Drucker difference.


This research approach comes from a simple model:

1.   Observation, either real or even imagined

2.   Analysis of the observation or imagination

3.   Construction of theory based on this analysis 


A sampling of Drucker’s theories derived analytically include:

·      That marketing and selling are not the same. 

·      Moreover, selling is not a subset of marketing and marketing and selling could be adversarial. Since, if the product or strategy chosen by the company were better, with the same effort and ability, the same salesmen might sell more product with less effort.

·      What everyone knows (or think they know) is usually wrong. This short statement was the one most uttered by Drucker in the classroom. 

·      Social Responsibility and Ethics are part of good leadership. 

·      Society demands that an organization be profitable, but not the maximum profit attainable.

·      Many managerial decisions are made from the gut, and these may be optimal despite complex analyses. 

·      Managers must ultimately make decisions from the gut.


What Drucker taught, worked, and the “Drucker Difference” produced many successful leaders using “Drucker Difference” skills. While other factors influence results and other research methods are still valuable, researchers using primary analytical research including Einstein confirm the value of the “Drucker Difference” confirming Drucker’s conclusion that Management is a Liberal Art.

On Decisions and their “Agents”

By Richard Johnson Ph.D. • December 17, 2025
This essay was inspired by an article recently published by Karen Linkletter and Pooya Tabesh (2025). They were in search of the meaning of “decision” in the works of Peter Drucker. To this end, they used Python to identify and locate all the times the word, “decision”, came up in Peter Drucker’s oeuvre . They then characterized the contexts (“themes”) in which the word came up. The result was a nuanced but very clear characterization of the evolution of his thinking on the topic. Here, we will focus on a key theme for Drucker: the case where your decisions involve other people’s decisions and actions . For present purposes, we can start with their statement: One of Drucker’s valuable contributions to the literature on decision-making is his adamance that implementation be built into the decision-making process.” (Linkletter and Tabesh 2025 8) To be clear, “…it is not a surprise that his integration of implementation of and commitment to decisions is part of his process of decision-making. He argues that a decision “has not been made until it has been realized in action.” (2025 8) The question, therefore, is how to make this happen, how to turn an organization from an aggregate of individuals whose decisions may or may not be aligned, into an agent—an entity that makes decisions, implements them, and then ascertains that what was done was, in fact, what was decided, as we try to do when making purely individual decisions. Let’s look at the matter more closely… A few years ago, I read a story about a road crew that was painting a double-yellow line on a highway. In their path was a dead raccoon that had been hit by a car or truck. It was lying right in the middle of the road. The crew didn’t stop. Someone later took a picture of the dead raccoon with a double-yellow line freshly painted right over it. The picture is below. It went viral on the Internet.

Paul Polman: Management, Sustainability, and Stewardship as a Liberal Art

By Robert Kirkland Ph.D. • December 17, 2025
When Paul Polman became CEO of Unilever in 2009, he did not inherit a troubled company. He stepped into a large global enterprise with familiar consumer brands that sat on shelves in cities from Amsterdam to Manila. Even with that scale and reach, the business rested on foundations that were beginning to crack. Public faith in multinational firms was fading, climate change was moving from a distant worry to a financial reality, and investors were increasingly locked into the rhythm of quarterly results that encouraged short term decisions and discouraged real strategy. Polman’s answer was surprisingly philosophical for a leader of such a company. Rather than defend profitability as the central corporate purpose, he attempted to redefine what the company was for. His response may suggest a contemporary expression of Peter Drucker’s idea of Management as a Liberal Art. Drucker described management as a moral undertaking that must be anchored in judgment, responsibility, and service, not only in efficiency or cost control. Redefining Corporate Purpose Soon after taking the role, Polman stunned many investors by ending quarterly earnings guidance. He went further and encouraged investors who focused only on short term returns to place their money elsewhere (Polman and Winston, 2021). The gesture appears to have been meant to reset the company’s relationship with financial markets. Drucker consistently argued that true leadership cannot be tied to the emotional fluctuations of short term financial reporting. By refusing to follow the ninety day cycle, Polman gave Unilever enough breathing space to think about long term issues. He also sent a powerful message inside the company. Unilever would no longer place shareholder extraction above every other consideration. Drucker might say that Polman was returning management to a place where purpose and meaning had priority. Drucker had long argued that institutions must be run for durability and social legitimacy, not just for quarterly outcomes (Drucker, 1946). The Unilever Sustainable Living Plan In 2010, Polman introduced the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan, which attempted to grow the company while reducing its environmental footprint (Unilever, 2010). The plan contained measurable goals for carbon emissions, water use, waste, sustainable sourcing, health, hygiene, nutrition, and economic livelihoods in the supply chain (Unilever, 2018). This was not presented as charity. It was presented as the business model itself. This approach fits well with Drucker’s view that a company must justify its existence through contributions to the common good (Drucker, 1946). Polman noted that a company serving billions of consumers could not thrive in a world marked by climate disruption, fragile supply chains, and social instability (Polman and Winston, 2021). He reframed sustainability as a competitive requirement. There are many examples of how this mindset influenced operations, such as targeted efforts to stabilize incomes for small farming communities or reduce water dependency in detergent production. Drucker would likely describe this approach as a return to institutional citizenship, which is the idea that power involves obligation (Drucker, 1989 and 1993). Human Dignity in Management Drucker believed that effective management is inseparable from human dignity. He argued that organizations must offer people both identity and contribution (Drucker, 1946). Polman appeared to take this to heart. Under his leadership, Unilever pushed for higher wages, safer working conditions, and expanded training programs across its vast networks of suppliers and small scale producers (Unilever, 2018). He also shifted language in a revealing way. Polman preferred speaking about farmers and families rather than vendors and suppliers (Polman and Winston, 2021). This change hinted at a deeper moral view of business. It positioned Unilever as a partner invested in the stability of the people who provided its raw materials. That reading fits closely with the idea of management as a liberal art, which sees leadership as an act of stewardship for the growth of people, not just the supervision of tasks (Drucker, 1989). Climate Leadership and Ethical Risk Management Drucker warned that management cannot be reduced to engineering efficiency. Managing also requires wrestling with consequences (Drucker, 1990). Polman pressed Unilever to treat climate risk as a direct business issue. He connected environmental damage to cost volatility, to consumer trust, and to the company’s long term future. Under his leadership, Unilever accelerated its use of renewable energy, sustainable materials, lighter packaging, and lower water use in many products (Unilever, 2010 and 2018). Polman’s climate agenda blended science, logistics, ethics, psychology, and an understanding of global politics. Drucker described this type of synthesis as central to Management as a Liberal Art. Responsible executives, he argued, must integrate many forms of knowledge into decisions (Drucker, 1989 and 1993). Polman framed sustainability as fiduciary responsibility rather than philanthropy. His influence is still visible in the way many global firms now treat environmental commitments as strategy rather than charity. This framing closely reflects Drucker’s view that corporate social responsibility must be rooted in a firm’s core mission, capabilities, and day-to-day operations rather than treated as a separate act of goodwill. By embedding sustainability into Unilever’s strategy and value chain, Polman demonstrated Drucker’s argument that responsible management integrates social obligations into how the business competes and performs, allowing ethical action and profitability to reinforce rather than undermine one another. Reviving Stakeholder Capitalism Polman helped restore credibility to the idea of stakeholder capitalism. He insisted that corporations must serve employees, consumers, suppliers, communities, and the environment rather than focus only on investor returns (Polman and Winston, 2021). He also pushed Unilever to evaluate brand performance partly through its social or health impact (Unilever, 2018). Under this model, brand equity included moral equity. This aligns with Drucker’s view that corporate legitimacy must be earned and never assumed (Drucker, 1989). For Polman, consumer trust was a survival requirement. When customers believe that a firm contributes to a worsening world, the company risks losing not just reputation but also the permission to operate (Drucker, 1990). Moral Leadership and Institutional Courage Polman spoke in moral terms more openly than most executives. He frequently challenged governments that fell short on climate commitments and he encouraged other business leaders to adopt fair labor standards and responsible tax behavior (Polman and Winston, 2021). Drucker argued that real authority is moral before it is positional. Polman’s conduct fits that idea well (Drucker, 1989 and 1990).  Inside the company, Polman asked employees to see themselves as contributors to social improvement and not merely as managers of brands or operations (Unilever, 2010). This practice reflects MLA. Drucker believed that people should find meaning and contribution through their work, not only wages (Drucker, 1989). Performance, Profit, and Purpose Some critics argue that purpose oriented leadership reduces profitability. Polman countered this by pointing to performance. During his tenure, Unilever posted steady growth, especially in emerging markets, improved margins, and delivered strong long term returns (Unilever, 2018). He argued that long term value and social value reinforce one another (Polman and Winston, 2021). Drucker had long dismissed the idea that ethical leadership conflicts with economic effectiveness (Drucker, 1999). Even with strong performance, tension remained. Certain investors disliked the refusal to play the quarterly guidance game. Some environmental advocates believed Unilever could have moved faster on issues such as plastics. Drucker never said that Management as a Liberal Art would eliminate conflict. He said that it would give leaders a moral compass for navigating conflict in a transparent way (Drucker, 1989). Polman seemed to follow that guidance by making tradeoffs visible and by emphasizing choices that protected dignity, stability, and ecological viability (Drucker, 1990). Building a Network of Responsible Institutions After leaving Unilever, Polman co founded Imagine, an organization that works with senior executives to accelerate progress toward the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (Polman and Winston, 2021). This next step reinforces the idea that sustainability for Polman is a theory of governance rather than a branding strategy. Drucker believed that modern society relies on networks of responsible institutions. These include corporations, governments, and nonprofit organizations that understand their interdependence and act accordingly (Drucker, 1946 and 1993). Polman’s post CEO work attempts to strengthen that network. He is essentially trying to rebuild the trust and cooperation among institutions that Drucker warned could erode in a fragmented society (Drucker, 1999). The Legacy of a Modern Druckerian Paul Polman’s leadership at Unilever provides one of the clearest contemporary examples of Drucker’s idea of Management as a Liberal Art. He treated the corporation as a civic institution rather than a simple profit generator. He wove climate stability, labor dignity, and social inclusion into the core of strategic planning. He asked brands to earn moral legitimacy. He emphasized supply chains as human communities. He took personal risks by arguing that corporations hold responsibility for the future of the planet on which their operations depend (Polman and Winston, 2021). In Drucker’s language, Polman practiced stewardship. He demonstrated that management concerns human beings, the communities they inhabit, and the ecological systems that support them (Drucker, 1989 and 1990). In an era shaped by climate upheaval, inequality, and declining institutional trust, Polman shifted the central question. Instead of asking whether companies can afford to care, he asked whether they can survive if they refuse to care at all. References Drucker, P. F. (1946). The concept of the corporation. New York: The John Day Company. Drucker, P. F. (1989). The new realities: In government and politics, in economics and business, in society and world view. New York: Harper & Row. Drucker, P. F. (1990). Managing the non-profit organization: Practices and principles. New York: HarperBusiness. Drucker, P. F. (1993). Post-capitalist society. New York: HarperBusiness. Drucker, P. F. (1999). Management challenges for the 21st century. New York: HarperBusiness. Polman, P., & Winston, A. (2021). Net Positive: How courageous companies thrive by giving more than they take. Harvard Business Review Press. Unilever. (2010). Unilever Sustainable Living Plan. Unilever PLC. Unilever. (2018). Sustainable sourcing and livelihoods progress report. Unilever PLC. World Business Council for Sustainable Development. (2019). Business leadership for a net-zero economy.

From a Functional to a Free Society-- The End of Economic Man: Drucker's Diagnosis of Totalitarianism

By Bo Yang Ph.D. • December 10, 2025
Peter Drucker suggested that readers view his first three books as a unified body of work: The End of Economic Man(1939), The Future of Industrial Man (1942), and Concept of the Corporation (1946). These works share a common theme: politics. Drucker did not think about politics like scholars who strictly follow modern social science norms. Instead, he viewed politics as part of social ecology and understood political events through the dynamic changes in social ecology. Despite having "corporation" in its title and using General Motors as a case study, Concept of the Corporation is indeed a book about politics. In this work, Drucker attempts to address the main issues that industrial society must resolve: the legitimacy of managerial authority, the status and function of managers and workers, and the power structure of society and organizations. In Drucker's own words, this is a book exploring the specific principles of industrial society. Corresponding to these specific social principles, Drucker had earlier attempted to develop a general social theory, which was the aim of The End of Economic Man and The Future of Industrial Man. The subtitle of The End of Economic Man is "The Origins of Totalitarianism." The book focuses on how society disintegrates in industrial societies and how totalitarianism rises. For Drucker, the real challenge of this topic isn't explaining how Hitler and Mussolini came to power, nor the actions of Germany and Italy in government, military, and economic spheres. Rather, it's understanding why some Europeans accepted clearly absurd totalitarian ideologies, and why others seemed potentially receptive to them. Drucker's writing style is argumentative. He clearly knew that to effectively advance his arguments, he needed to engage with popular theories of his time. Back then, there were two main explanatory approaches to Nazism and Fascism, which Drucker termed "illusions." Some viewed totalitarianism as ordinary political turmoil similar to previous historical revolutions. In their view, totalitarianism was characterized merely by cruelty, disruption of order, propaganda, and manipulation. Others considered totalitarianism a phenomenon unique to Germany and Italy, related to their specific national characters. Drucker thoroughly refuted explanations based on "national character." He believed that any historical approach appealing to "national character" was pseudo-history. Such theories always emphasize that certain events were inevitable in certain places. But all claims of "inevitability" negate human free will and thus deny politics: without human choice, there is no politics. If the rise of totalitarianism were inevitable, there would be no need or possibility to oppose it. Viewing totalitarianism as an ordinary revolution is equally dangerous. This thinking merely emphasizes how bad Nazis and Fascists were. But the real issue is that Europeans were not merely submitting out of fear—they were actually attracted to totalitarianism. And those attracted weren't just the ignorant masses but also well-educated intellectual elites, especially the younger generation. The world cannot defeat totalitarianism through contempt alone, especially if that contempt stems from ignorance. Understanding the enemy is a prerequisite to defeating it. Drucker identified three main characteristics of Nazism and Fascism (totalitarianism is a social type, with Nazism and Fascism being its representatives in industrialized Europe): 1. The complete rejection of freedom and equality, which are the core beliefs of European civilization, without offering any positive alternative beliefs. 2. The complete rejection of the promise of legitimate power. Power must have legitimacy—this is a long-standing tradition in European politics. For power to have legitimacy means that it makes a commitment to the fundamental beliefs of civilization. Totalitarianism denied all European beliefs, thereby liberating power from the burden of responsibility. 3. The discovery and exploitation of mass psychology: in times of absolute despair, the more absurd something is, the more people are willing to believe it. The End of Economic Man develops a diagnosis of totalitarianism around these three characteristics. Drucker offers a deeper insight: totalitarianism is actually a solution to many chronic problems in industrial society. At a time when European industrial society was on the verge of collapse, totalitarians at least identified the problems and offered some solutions. This is why they possessed such magical appeal. Why did totalitarianism completely reject the basic beliefs of European civilization? Drucker's answer: neither traditional capitalism nor Marxist socialism could fulfill their promises of freedom and equality. "Economic Man" in Drucker's book has a different meaning than in Adam Smith's work. "Economic Man" refers to people living in capitalist or socialist societies who believe that through economic progress, a free and equal world would "automatically" emerge. The reality was that capitalism's economic freedom exacerbated social inequality, while socialism not only failed to eliminate inequality but created an even more rigid privileged class. Since neither capitalism nor socialism could "automatically" realize freedom and equality, Europeans lost faith in both systems. Simultaneously, they lost faith in freedom and equality themselves. Throughout European history, people sought freedom and equality in different social domains. In the 19th century, people projected their pursuit of freedom and equality onto the economic sphere. The industrial realities of the 20th century, along with the Great Depression and war, shattered these hopes. People didn't know where else to look for freedom and equality. The emerging totalitarianism offered a subversive answer: freedom and equality aren't worth pursuing; race and the leader are the true beliefs. Why did totalitarianism reject the promise of power legitimacy? One reason was that political power abandoned its responsibility to European core beliefs. Another reason came from the new realities of industrial society. Drucker held a lifelong view: the key distinction between industrial society and 19th-century commercial society was the separation of ownership and management. The role of capitalists was no longer important. Those who truly dominated the social industrial sphere were corporate managers and executives. These people effectively held decisive power but had not gained political and social status matching their power. When a class's power and political status don't match, it doesn't know how to properly use its power. Drucker believed this was a problem all industrial societies must solve. Totalitarianism keenly perceived this issue. The Nazis maintained property rights for business owners but brought the management of factories and companies under government control. This way, social power and political power became unified. This unified power was no longer restricted or regulated—it became the rule itself. Why could totalitarianism make the masses believe absurd things? Because Europeans had nothing left to believe in. Each individual can only understand society and their own life when they have status and function. Those thrown out of normal life by the Great Depression and war lost their status and function. For them, society was a desperate dark jungle. Even those who temporarily kept their jobs didn't know the meaning of their current life. The Nazi system could provide a sense of meaning in this vacuum of meaning—though false, it was timely. Using the wartime economic system, the Nazis created stable employment in a short time. In the Nazi industrial system, both business owners and workers were exploited. But outside the industrial production system, Nazis created various revolutionary organizations and movements. In those organizations and movements, poor workers became leaders, while business owners and professors became servants. In the hysterical revolutionary fervor, people regained status and function. Economic interests were no longer important, freedom and equality were no longer important; being involved in the revolution (status) and dying for it (function) became life's meaning. The Nazis replaced the calm and shrewd "Economic Man" with the hysterical "Heroic Man." Though absurd, this new concept of humanity had appeal. What people needed was not rationality but a sense of meaning that could temporarily fill the void. Those theorists who despised totalitarianism only emphasized its evil. Drucker, however, emphasized its appeal. He viewed totalitarianism as one solution to the crisis of industrial society. From 19th-century commercial society to 20th-century industrial society, the reality of society changed dramatically. 19th-century ideas, institutions, and habits could not solve 20th-century problems. Capitalism could not fulfill its promises about freedom and equality, and neither could Marxism. It was at this point that totalitarianism emerged. Nazism and Fascism attempted to build a new society in a way completely different from European civilization. Drucker said the real danger was not that they couldn't succeed, but that they almost did. They addressed the relationship between political power and social power, proposed alternative beliefs to freedom and equality (though only negative ones), and on this basis provided social members with new status and function. The war against totalitarianism cannot be waged merely through contempt. Defeating totalitarianism is not just a battlefield matter. Those who hate totalitarianism and love freedom must find better solutions than totalitarianism to build a normally functioning and free industrial society. Totalitarianism gave wrong and evil answers. But they at least asked the right questions. Industrial society must address several issues: the legitimacy of power (government power and social power), individual status and function, and society's basic beliefs. These issues became the fundamental threads in Drucker's exploration of industrial society reconstruction in The Future of Industrial Man. The Future of Industrial Man: From Totalitarian Diagnosis to General Social Theory Both The End of Economic Man and The Future of Industrial Man feature the prose style of 19th-century historians. Even today, readers can appreciate the author's profound historical knowledge and wise historical commentary. For today's readers, the real challenge of these two books lies in Drucker's theoretical interests. He doesn't simply narrate history but organizes and explains historical facts using his unique beliefs and methods. In The End of Economic Man, Drucker developed his diagnosis of totalitarianism around three issues: power legitimacy, individual status-function, and society's basic beliefs. In The Future of Industrial Man, he also constructs a general social theory around these three issues. In "What Is A Functioning Society," Drucker explains three sets of tensions that exist in social ecology: 
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