How Drucker Can Make You a More Effective Manager

William Cohen, Ph.D.

PUBLISHED:

September 22, 2022

Drucker was different than other management gurus. He didn’t even like to be called a guru but preferred a scientific description of his work: “social ecologist”. This described the study of people and their behavior in organizations. His discoveries and conclusions were important, and far from intuitive. They were powerful and effective. They were also frequently controversial.  For example, encouraging a client to sell or close profitable businesses is hardly music to anyone’s ears, but that was the recommendation to Jack Welch when Welch became CEO of General Electric and Drucker became his consultant.

 

Drucker’s Counterintuitive Advice Brought in Billions 


Drucker told Welch to sell or close profitable GE businesses to gain resources to invest in newer businesses that had more potential. This was far from intuitive, and created detractors, and enemies who called Welch “Neutron Jack” after the neuron bomb which left structures standing while it killed the inhabitants. This may have contributed to Welch’s willingness to explain Drucker’s role as a consultant and this situation fully, something that many clients and consultants tend not to talk about but to keep consulting confidential to avoid lawsuits or expose tactics to competitors. Fortunately for us, by mutual agreement Welch released the explanation. 

 

Drucker called this his “abandonment theory” and necessary for successful innovation and expansion. He said that otherwise older businesses, even if still profitable, would tend to consume resources and dominate the efforts of some of his best people while newer businesses, no matter if greater potential, would be ignored. 

 

Welch did as Drucker recommended. Though criticized and berated by the business press and even many academics, he thereby increased GE’s market value from $12 billion in 1981 when he became CEO, to $410 billion on his retirement nine years later. He had made an astounding 600 acquisitions in emerging markets. They brought GE a fortune. When he retired, he was awarded the largest retirement package in history and Fortune Magazine named Welch Manager of the Century. 

 

A Completely Different Approach to Consulting, Too 


Drucker also differed greatly in his consulting model from any other management consultant and his method is rarely practiced today.  Drucker claimed that his methods of analyzing issues, solving problems, and making recommendations were not based on his knowledge and his experience, but rather his ignorance and lack of experience in a specific business or industry. This required him to ask a lot of questions of his clients to unearth the critical information and encourage the maximum minds in the organization to solve their own problem. He said that his client’s managers were the true experts, not he. This unusual mindset and its procedures for consulting explain a lot. 

 

The Trials and Tribulations of Being a Drucker Client 


I once heard that the way Drucker provided his consulting was the most difficult and unusual aspect about being a Drucker consulting client. One client expressed it this way: “We had been accustomed to hiring consultants to whom we told what we wanted done. They sold us on their expertise. Then they went off and returned after a time with piles of data and reports, and before the era of Power Points, stacks of Overheads which represented their work and their detailed solution to our problem. They presented themselves as having unique knowledge which others lacked. It’s not that their solutions flopped, but they were routine. Drucker would begin with asking us questions which we were expected to answer and discuss. In the process, we had to think through the problem. This generated solutions which were frequently unique, and we would have otherwise overlooked. At first this this was uncomfortable, but eventually we began to appreciate his system and found it of great value.” 

 

The Chinese philanthropist and successful billionaire businessman, Minglo Shao, who founded Drucker Schools all over China with Drucker’s encouragement also contributed the money to start and run the MBA-granting, accredited and nonprofit California Institute of Advanced Management of which I served as president for five years. He told me that he would visit Drucker in his home occasionally and Drucker would ask him questions about various issues regarding the developments of his businesses and foundations in China and elsewhere. However, though Drucker asked questions which opened new insights and guided him as what he would do, Drucker never told him how to do anything. He had to work that out himself. 


The Most Difficult Action --- To Think! 


Although Drucker was aware of many innovative methodologies for analyzing business situations and developing strategies, he made almost no use of them. Instead, he emphasized thinking through every situation on its own. For example, he never taught “portfolio analysis” with their famous quadrants of cash cows, shooting stars, problem children, or dogs as developed by the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) or the GE/McKinsey nine cell version, or any other version of management or business strategy by rote system. He developed few special systems himself. These were integrated with a philosophy of integrity and social responsibility which were required in implementation of everything he did. 

 

“Fad” Systems 


Drucker was aware of new fads which became popular, but he was extremely cautious in applying them without thinking through each individually as whether it made sense to employ it in a particular situation. 

 

Although his close association with and analysis of management methods and philosophies in Japan gained him numerous insights, and mangers in Japan frequently adopted many of Drucker’s ideas, he did not instantly jump on the bandwagon of “Japanese Management” when it took hold in the U.S. in the early 1980s. He maintained that any culture had to apply what worked best for it and what worked perfectly in one culture might not work in another. He was highly suspicious of all systems of the kind which Fortune Magazine termed “management by fad” 

 

 

Example: Participatory Management 


When organizations joined the participatory management idea based on Douglas McGregor’s research and his explanation of Theory X verses Theory Y in the early 1960s, Drucker pointed out that McGregor intended that Theory Y management with significant participation of the managed, was an alternative to the more directive style practiced almost exclusively previously. Drucker noted what almost all adopters of Theory Y missed: that McGregor himself had written that his intent was to describe an alternative management style which might give better results under certain circumstances, and that research should be conducted to uncover exactly what these circumstances were, not that participatory management was the universal solution in all situations. For example, participatory management might not be the best during emergencies, when decisions must be made under the pressures of limited time, or when those led were inexperienced and uncertain or were overconfident. 

 

Feelings May be More Important than Numbers 


Drucker insisted on measuring just about everything, but the results were to be considered informational, not quantitative analysis for business decisions” made solely by numerical calculation. He avoided decision making whereby the decision was arrived at solely by inputting certain data considered important into a software program, turning on a computer, and having the strategy instructions automatically appear. He pointed out that although one could gather data and develop a program based on thousands of business experiences, even the weather; still the information could be incomplete. Designing software based on extensive data, and inputting data unique to your situation might predict results with some high percentage of accuracy, say 92.5 percent, and still fail in your situation. 

 

Drucker maintained that computer-generated answers were inferior to using the human brain and even making a “gut” decision based on integrating all available information, personal experience, even knowledge of the personnel involved and their leadership and integrity. He noted that personal knowledge or instinct of one single, but vital, factor might well be decisive, and that a computer might never consider it. Also, he reasoned that though a certain program might produce accurate results 92.5 per cent of the time, for 7.5 per cent of the time the results were 100% inaccurate. He recommended that managerial decisions made with “a gut feel” after considering all the information that could be obtained and integrated by the brain not be ignored. This method however should not be employed frivolously and without thought. The brain was a better device than a computer or maybe the better computer of the two. 

 

The application of Drucker’s consulting, or management principles were based on four basic principles: 

  • Questioning and gathering information from all sources including managers and their subordinates 
  • Using the human brain rather than “management by fad” depending on the situation 
  • Gathering all the information possible and the use of computers, but the manager and not a machine or a methodology making the final decision 
  • Maintaining high integrity and social responsibility in all decisionmaking. 

 

*Adapted from Principles and Lessons from the World’s Leading Management Consultant by William A. Cohen  published by LID in 2018 and syndicated internationally. 

 

On Decisions and their “Agents”

By Richard Johnson Ph.D. • December 17, 2025
This essay was inspired by an article recently published by Karen Linkletter and Pooya Tabesh (2025). They were in search of the meaning of “decision” in the works of Peter Drucker. To this end, they used Python to identify and locate all the times the word, “decision”, came up in Peter Drucker’s oeuvre . They then characterized the contexts (“themes”) in which the word came up. The result was a nuanced but very clear characterization of the evolution of his thinking on the topic. Here, we will focus on a key theme for Drucker: the case where your decisions involve other people’s decisions and actions . For present purposes, we can start with their statement: One of Drucker’s valuable contributions to the literature on decision-making is his adamance that implementation be built into the decision-making process.” (Linkletter and Tabesh 2025 8) To be clear, “…it is not a surprise that his integration of implementation of and commitment to decisions is part of his process of decision-making. He argues that a decision “has not been made until it has been realized in action.” (2025 8) The question, therefore, is how to make this happen, how to turn an organization from an aggregate of individuals whose decisions may or may not be aligned, into an agent—an entity that makes decisions, implements them, and then ascertains that what was done was, in fact, what was decided, as we try to do when making purely individual decisions. Let’s look at the matter more closely… A few years ago, I read a story about a road crew that was painting a double-yellow line on a highway. In their path was a dead raccoon that had been hit by a car or truck. It was lying right in the middle of the road. The crew didn’t stop. Someone later took a picture of the dead raccoon with a double-yellow line freshly painted right over it. The picture is below. It went viral on the Internet.

Paul Polman: Management, Sustainability, and Stewardship as a Liberal Art

By Robert Kirkland Ph.D. • December 17, 2025
When Paul Polman became CEO of Unilever in 2009, he did not inherit a troubled company. He stepped into a large global enterprise with familiar consumer brands that sat on shelves in cities from Amsterdam to Manila. Even with that scale and reach, the business rested on foundations that were beginning to crack. Public faith in multinational firms was fading, climate change was moving from a distant worry to a financial reality, and investors were increasingly locked into the rhythm of quarterly results that encouraged short term decisions and discouraged real strategy. Polman’s answer was surprisingly philosophical for a leader of such a company. Rather than defend profitability as the central corporate purpose, he attempted to redefine what the company was for. His response may suggest a contemporary expression of Peter Drucker’s idea of Management as a Liberal Art. Drucker described management as a moral undertaking that must be anchored in judgment, responsibility, and service, not only in efficiency or cost control. Redefining Corporate Purpose Soon after taking the role, Polman stunned many investors by ending quarterly earnings guidance. He went further and encouraged investors who focused only on short term returns to place their money elsewhere (Polman and Winston, 2021). The gesture appears to have been meant to reset the company’s relationship with financial markets. Drucker consistently argued that true leadership cannot be tied to the emotional fluctuations of short term financial reporting. By refusing to follow the ninety day cycle, Polman gave Unilever enough breathing space to think about long term issues. He also sent a powerful message inside the company. Unilever would no longer place shareholder extraction above every other consideration. Drucker might say that Polman was returning management to a place where purpose and meaning had priority. Drucker had long argued that institutions must be run for durability and social legitimacy, not just for quarterly outcomes (Drucker, 1946). The Unilever Sustainable Living Plan In 2010, Polman introduced the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan, which attempted to grow the company while reducing its environmental footprint (Unilever, 2010). The plan contained measurable goals for carbon emissions, water use, waste, sustainable sourcing, health, hygiene, nutrition, and economic livelihoods in the supply chain (Unilever, 2018). This was not presented as charity. It was presented as the business model itself. This approach fits well with Drucker’s view that a company must justify its existence through contributions to the common good (Drucker, 1946). Polman noted that a company serving billions of consumers could not thrive in a world marked by climate disruption, fragile supply chains, and social instability (Polman and Winston, 2021). He reframed sustainability as a competitive requirement. There are many examples of how this mindset influenced operations, such as targeted efforts to stabilize incomes for small farming communities or reduce water dependency in detergent production. Drucker would likely describe this approach as a return to institutional citizenship, which is the idea that power involves obligation (Drucker, 1989 and 1993). Human Dignity in Management Drucker believed that effective management is inseparable from human dignity. He argued that organizations must offer people both identity and contribution (Drucker, 1946). Polman appeared to take this to heart. Under his leadership, Unilever pushed for higher wages, safer working conditions, and expanded training programs across its vast networks of suppliers and small scale producers (Unilever, 2018). He also shifted language in a revealing way. Polman preferred speaking about farmers and families rather than vendors and suppliers (Polman and Winston, 2021). This change hinted at a deeper moral view of business. It positioned Unilever as a partner invested in the stability of the people who provided its raw materials. That reading fits closely with the idea of management as a liberal art, which sees leadership as an act of stewardship for the growth of people, not just the supervision of tasks (Drucker, 1989). Climate Leadership and Ethical Risk Management Drucker warned that management cannot be reduced to engineering efficiency. Managing also requires wrestling with consequences (Drucker, 1990). Polman pressed Unilever to treat climate risk as a direct business issue. He connected environmental damage to cost volatility, to consumer trust, and to the company’s long term future. Under his leadership, Unilever accelerated its use of renewable energy, sustainable materials, lighter packaging, and lower water use in many products (Unilever, 2010 and 2018). Polman’s climate agenda blended science, logistics, ethics, psychology, and an understanding of global politics. Drucker described this type of synthesis as central to Management as a Liberal Art. Responsible executives, he argued, must integrate many forms of knowledge into decisions (Drucker, 1989 and 1993). Polman framed sustainability as fiduciary responsibility rather than philanthropy. His influence is still visible in the way many global firms now treat environmental commitments as strategy rather than charity. This framing closely reflects Drucker’s view that corporate social responsibility must be rooted in a firm’s core mission, capabilities, and day-to-day operations rather than treated as a separate act of goodwill. By embedding sustainability into Unilever’s strategy and value chain, Polman demonstrated Drucker’s argument that responsible management integrates social obligations into how the business competes and performs, allowing ethical action and profitability to reinforce rather than undermine one another. Reviving Stakeholder Capitalism Polman helped restore credibility to the idea of stakeholder capitalism. He insisted that corporations must serve employees, consumers, suppliers, communities, and the environment rather than focus only on investor returns (Polman and Winston, 2021). He also pushed Unilever to evaluate brand performance partly through its social or health impact (Unilever, 2018). Under this model, brand equity included moral equity. This aligns with Drucker’s view that corporate legitimacy must be earned and never assumed (Drucker, 1989). For Polman, consumer trust was a survival requirement. When customers believe that a firm contributes to a worsening world, the company risks losing not just reputation but also the permission to operate (Drucker, 1990). Moral Leadership and Institutional Courage Polman spoke in moral terms more openly than most executives. He frequently challenged governments that fell short on climate commitments and he encouraged other business leaders to adopt fair labor standards and responsible tax behavior (Polman and Winston, 2021). Drucker argued that real authority is moral before it is positional. Polman’s conduct fits that idea well (Drucker, 1989 and 1990).  Inside the company, Polman asked employees to see themselves as contributors to social improvement and not merely as managers of brands or operations (Unilever, 2010). This practice reflects MLA. Drucker believed that people should find meaning and contribution through their work, not only wages (Drucker, 1989). Performance, Profit, and Purpose Some critics argue that purpose oriented leadership reduces profitability. Polman countered this by pointing to performance. During his tenure, Unilever posted steady growth, especially in emerging markets, improved margins, and delivered strong long term returns (Unilever, 2018). He argued that long term value and social value reinforce one another (Polman and Winston, 2021). Drucker had long dismissed the idea that ethical leadership conflicts with economic effectiveness (Drucker, 1999). Even with strong performance, tension remained. Certain investors disliked the refusal to play the quarterly guidance game. Some environmental advocates believed Unilever could have moved faster on issues such as plastics. Drucker never said that Management as a Liberal Art would eliminate conflict. He said that it would give leaders a moral compass for navigating conflict in a transparent way (Drucker, 1989). Polman seemed to follow that guidance by making tradeoffs visible and by emphasizing choices that protected dignity, stability, and ecological viability (Drucker, 1990). Building a Network of Responsible Institutions After leaving Unilever, Polman co founded Imagine, an organization that works with senior executives to accelerate progress toward the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (Polman and Winston, 2021). This next step reinforces the idea that sustainability for Polman is a theory of governance rather than a branding strategy. Drucker believed that modern society relies on networks of responsible institutions. These include corporations, governments, and nonprofit organizations that understand their interdependence and act accordingly (Drucker, 1946 and 1993). Polman’s post CEO work attempts to strengthen that network. He is essentially trying to rebuild the trust and cooperation among institutions that Drucker warned could erode in a fragmented society (Drucker, 1999). The Legacy of a Modern Druckerian Paul Polman’s leadership at Unilever provides one of the clearest contemporary examples of Drucker’s idea of Management as a Liberal Art. He treated the corporation as a civic institution rather than a simple profit generator. He wove climate stability, labor dignity, and social inclusion into the core of strategic planning. He asked brands to earn moral legitimacy. He emphasized supply chains as human communities. He took personal risks by arguing that corporations hold responsibility for the future of the planet on which their operations depend (Polman and Winston, 2021). In Drucker’s language, Polman practiced stewardship. He demonstrated that management concerns human beings, the communities they inhabit, and the ecological systems that support them (Drucker, 1989 and 1990). In an era shaped by climate upheaval, inequality, and declining institutional trust, Polman shifted the central question. Instead of asking whether companies can afford to care, he asked whether they can survive if they refuse to care at all. References Drucker, P. F. (1946). The concept of the corporation. New York: The John Day Company. Drucker, P. F. (1989). The new realities: In government and politics, in economics and business, in society and world view. New York: Harper & Row. Drucker, P. F. (1990). Managing the non-profit organization: Practices and principles. New York: HarperBusiness. Drucker, P. F. (1993). Post-capitalist society. New York: HarperBusiness. Drucker, P. F. (1999). Management challenges for the 21st century. New York: HarperBusiness. Polman, P., & Winston, A. (2021). Net Positive: How courageous companies thrive by giving more than they take. Harvard Business Review Press. Unilever. (2010). Unilever Sustainable Living Plan. Unilever PLC. Unilever. (2018). Sustainable sourcing and livelihoods progress report. Unilever PLC. World Business Council for Sustainable Development. (2019). Business leadership for a net-zero economy.

From a Functional to a Free Society-- The End of Economic Man: Drucker's Diagnosis of Totalitarianism

By Bo Yang Ph.D. • December 10, 2025
Peter Drucker suggested that readers view his first three books as a unified body of work: The End of Economic Man(1939), The Future of Industrial Man (1942), and Concept of the Corporation (1946). These works share a common theme: politics. Drucker did not think about politics like scholars who strictly follow modern social science norms. Instead, he viewed politics as part of social ecology and understood political events through the dynamic changes in social ecology. Despite having "corporation" in its title and using General Motors as a case study, Concept of the Corporation is indeed a book about politics. In this work, Drucker attempts to address the main issues that industrial society must resolve: the legitimacy of managerial authority, the status and function of managers and workers, and the power structure of society and organizations. In Drucker's own words, this is a book exploring the specific principles of industrial society. Corresponding to these specific social principles, Drucker had earlier attempted to develop a general social theory, which was the aim of The End of Economic Man and The Future of Industrial Man. The subtitle of The End of Economic Man is "The Origins of Totalitarianism." The book focuses on how society disintegrates in industrial societies and how totalitarianism rises. For Drucker, the real challenge of this topic isn't explaining how Hitler and Mussolini came to power, nor the actions of Germany and Italy in government, military, and economic spheres. Rather, it's understanding why some Europeans accepted clearly absurd totalitarian ideologies, and why others seemed potentially receptive to them. Drucker's writing style is argumentative. He clearly knew that to effectively advance his arguments, he needed to engage with popular theories of his time. Back then, there were two main explanatory approaches to Nazism and Fascism, which Drucker termed "illusions." Some viewed totalitarianism as ordinary political turmoil similar to previous historical revolutions. In their view, totalitarianism was characterized merely by cruelty, disruption of order, propaganda, and manipulation. Others considered totalitarianism a phenomenon unique to Germany and Italy, related to their specific national characters. Drucker thoroughly refuted explanations based on "national character." He believed that any historical approach appealing to "national character" was pseudo-history. Such theories always emphasize that certain events were inevitable in certain places. But all claims of "inevitability" negate human free will and thus deny politics: without human choice, there is no politics. If the rise of totalitarianism were inevitable, there would be no need or possibility to oppose it. Viewing totalitarianism as an ordinary revolution is equally dangerous. This thinking merely emphasizes how bad Nazis and Fascists were. But the real issue is that Europeans were not merely submitting out of fear—they were actually attracted to totalitarianism. And those attracted weren't just the ignorant masses but also well-educated intellectual elites, especially the younger generation. The world cannot defeat totalitarianism through contempt alone, especially if that contempt stems from ignorance. Understanding the enemy is a prerequisite to defeating it. Drucker identified three main characteristics of Nazism and Fascism (totalitarianism is a social type, with Nazism and Fascism being its representatives in industrialized Europe): 1. The complete rejection of freedom and equality, which are the core beliefs of European civilization, without offering any positive alternative beliefs. 2. The complete rejection of the promise of legitimate power. Power must have legitimacy—this is a long-standing tradition in European politics. For power to have legitimacy means that it makes a commitment to the fundamental beliefs of civilization. Totalitarianism denied all European beliefs, thereby liberating power from the burden of responsibility. 3. The discovery and exploitation of mass psychology: in times of absolute despair, the more absurd something is, the more people are willing to believe it. The End of Economic Man develops a diagnosis of totalitarianism around these three characteristics. Drucker offers a deeper insight: totalitarianism is actually a solution to many chronic problems in industrial society. At a time when European industrial society was on the verge of collapse, totalitarians at least identified the problems and offered some solutions. This is why they possessed such magical appeal. Why did totalitarianism completely reject the basic beliefs of European civilization? Drucker's answer: neither traditional capitalism nor Marxist socialism could fulfill their promises of freedom and equality. "Economic Man" in Drucker's book has a different meaning than in Adam Smith's work. "Economic Man" refers to people living in capitalist or socialist societies who believe that through economic progress, a free and equal world would "automatically" emerge. The reality was that capitalism's economic freedom exacerbated social inequality, while socialism not only failed to eliminate inequality but created an even more rigid privileged class. Since neither capitalism nor socialism could "automatically" realize freedom and equality, Europeans lost faith in both systems. Simultaneously, they lost faith in freedom and equality themselves. Throughout European history, people sought freedom and equality in different social domains. In the 19th century, people projected their pursuit of freedom and equality onto the economic sphere. The industrial realities of the 20th century, along with the Great Depression and war, shattered these hopes. People didn't know where else to look for freedom and equality. The emerging totalitarianism offered a subversive answer: freedom and equality aren't worth pursuing; race and the leader are the true beliefs. Why did totalitarianism reject the promise of power legitimacy? One reason was that political power abandoned its responsibility to European core beliefs. Another reason came from the new realities of industrial society. Drucker held a lifelong view: the key distinction between industrial society and 19th-century commercial society was the separation of ownership and management. The role of capitalists was no longer important. Those who truly dominated the social industrial sphere were corporate managers and executives. These people effectively held decisive power but had not gained political and social status matching their power. When a class's power and political status don't match, it doesn't know how to properly use its power. Drucker believed this was a problem all industrial societies must solve. Totalitarianism keenly perceived this issue. The Nazis maintained property rights for business owners but brought the management of factories and companies under government control. This way, social power and political power became unified. This unified power was no longer restricted or regulated—it became the rule itself. Why could totalitarianism make the masses believe absurd things? Because Europeans had nothing left to believe in. Each individual can only understand society and their own life when they have status and function. Those thrown out of normal life by the Great Depression and war lost their status and function. For them, society was a desperate dark jungle. Even those who temporarily kept their jobs didn't know the meaning of their current life. The Nazi system could provide a sense of meaning in this vacuum of meaning—though false, it was timely. Using the wartime economic system, the Nazis created stable employment in a short time. In the Nazi industrial system, both business owners and workers were exploited. But outside the industrial production system, Nazis created various revolutionary organizations and movements. In those organizations and movements, poor workers became leaders, while business owners and professors became servants. In the hysterical revolutionary fervor, people regained status and function. Economic interests were no longer important, freedom and equality were no longer important; being involved in the revolution (status) and dying for it (function) became life's meaning. The Nazis replaced the calm and shrewd "Economic Man" with the hysterical "Heroic Man." Though absurd, this new concept of humanity had appeal. What people needed was not rationality but a sense of meaning that could temporarily fill the void. Those theorists who despised totalitarianism only emphasized its evil. Drucker, however, emphasized its appeal. He viewed totalitarianism as one solution to the crisis of industrial society. From 19th-century commercial society to 20th-century industrial society, the reality of society changed dramatically. 19th-century ideas, institutions, and habits could not solve 20th-century problems. Capitalism could not fulfill its promises about freedom and equality, and neither could Marxism. It was at this point that totalitarianism emerged. Nazism and Fascism attempted to build a new society in a way completely different from European civilization. Drucker said the real danger was not that they couldn't succeed, but that they almost did. They addressed the relationship between political power and social power, proposed alternative beliefs to freedom and equality (though only negative ones), and on this basis provided social members with new status and function. The war against totalitarianism cannot be waged merely through contempt. Defeating totalitarianism is not just a battlefield matter. Those who hate totalitarianism and love freedom must find better solutions than totalitarianism to build a normally functioning and free industrial society. Totalitarianism gave wrong and evil answers. But they at least asked the right questions. Industrial society must address several issues: the legitimacy of power (government power and social power), individual status and function, and society's basic beliefs. These issues became the fundamental threads in Drucker's exploration of industrial society reconstruction in The Future of Industrial Man. The Future of Industrial Man: From Totalitarian Diagnosis to General Social Theory Both The End of Economic Man and The Future of Industrial Man feature the prose style of 19th-century historians. Even today, readers can appreciate the author's profound historical knowledge and wise historical commentary. For today's readers, the real challenge of these two books lies in Drucker's theoretical interests. He doesn't simply narrate history but organizes and explains historical facts using his unique beliefs and methods. In The End of Economic Man, Drucker developed his diagnosis of totalitarianism around three issues: power legitimacy, individual status-function, and society's basic beliefs. In The Future of Industrial Man, he also constructs a general social theory around these three issues. In "What Is A Functioning Society," Drucker explains three sets of tensions that exist in social ecology: 
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