Drucker’s Approach to Strategy is Amazingly Valid

William A. Cohen, Ph.D.

PUBLISHED:

June 7, 2023

I’ve read recent comments to the effect that though Drucker’s approach to strategy has been highly effective in the past, because of the pandemic, it was time to develop something new. Drucker was considered the father of modern management, but Drucker did not believe that management was a science. He insisted that it was properly described as a practice. This is important in any approach to strategy. In fact, it would not be amiss to look at the strategy as a doctor practices medicine. Science plays an important part in medicine, but doctors consider the individual situation as he or she practices medicine. Note the difference.

 

While a medical scientist seeks and develops medicines which cure ailments in many situations, as a practitioner the doctor realizes that medicines, no matter how powerful, won’t work in every case. He recognizes that every case is different and analyzes every illness, with its unique characteristics, to find a treatment that works best in the treatment of the patient. In addition, the medical practitioner has an oath to which strategy must conform: “Above all, do no harm.” Too bad that the business practitioner doesn’t take a similar vow. In effect, Drucker did take care to do no harm and followed no single strategy “system” for all situations.

 

When I was Drucker’s PhD student, I learned from him that because management is not a science, using mathematics alone is not the only analysis that must be done and Drucker, to avoid doing harm, used no fixed system. For example, one widely used system in those days was portfolio analysis developed by Bruce Henderson at the Boston Consulting Group. That’s the one, with cash cows, dogs, shooting stars, problem children etc. The problem, Drucker said, was not that this was a bad system, but if applied to all situations it would sometimes fail because growth of the organization was always judged the main factor in success. However, a business could be successful and profitable while remaining small and if an organization grew primarily by acquisition, it was successful only if the acquiring organization had something to contribute to what was acquired. A review of companies which had used BCG’s analysis proved his point. Many had failed because after acquiring a company, the acquiring organization had little to contribute, and growth alone did not necessarily result in success. The  BCG method was modified by the work of GE and McKinsey and others. However, the danger of using a cookie-cutter approach in all situations persists because even basic assumptions can be wrong.

 

“Quantitative analysis for business decisions” is frequently the basic tool guiding strategy because a resulting high number identifies the greatest potential profit. But is it? Drucker showed us examples that while mathematically a high price frequently indicated highest profits it also attracted competitors who enjoyed an advantage. Such  a competitor could achieve profitability even if it had neither invented nor taken the original product to market. 

 

The transistor radio was one example he cited. Many think it was Sony, a Japanese company, that first developed and sold the millions of transistor radios profitably and that American companies were never able to compete  successfully. The reality was that the transistor radio was invented in the U.S. and sold first by AT&T which calculated that a significantly higher price could be charged, and even additional money attained by licensing other companies to manufacture and sell this product. Sony, with lower labor costs, saw the opportunity and bought such a license from AT&T. With the lower labor cost in Japan and some product improvements, Sony dominated the market in the U.S. and forced AT&T out of the business.

 

Even computers and a program developed based on the success of other organizations has shown to be unreliable. A single condition in a previous marketing campaign might be unknown and not duplicated. For example, the impact of the quality of leadership available in an organization is always important. Yet, it is usually not incorporated into the computer model and in any case, leadership is difficult to quantify.

 

Good Tactical Implementation Cannot Overcome Poor Strategy

The word “strategy” comes from a Greek word meaning “the art of the general.” As a part of this art, generals separate military strategy into three divisions of action. Tactics are performed at the lowest level. It is the strategy employed by those involved in execution at the fighting level. The next highest level is the strategy employed by more senior generals and is concerned with the strategy of the battle. At the highest level is grand strategy employed by politicians and senior generals at the highest levels in positioning their forces geographically and timing with overall objectives defining what they are trying to do, what battles they are going to fight and when, and considering political and many other situational factors as well as the stages of the overall operation.

 

Tactics Vs. Higher Level Strategy

I once read that good tactical implementation could overcome a bad strategy initiated at a higher level. Drucker pointed out that good tactical implementation of a bad higher level strategy can even make the situation worse, not better. Good tactical execution at the “fighting level” may succeed, but in some scenarios, it might be better if it had failed. He gave the example of expert salespeople succeeding though they had a product not much desired by potential customers. Their sales talents might result in more acceptable results, but clear failure might have forced the company to drop the product and replace it with a more desirable one. Tactical implementation offering something more desired by potential customers is also a lot easier on the salespeople who can sell more of a needed product to potential customers with less effort, while the wrong product even sold profitably by good salespeople can cause the company to overlook and misidentify the real need of the customer while a competitor may find and sell a better product to greater advantage.

 

How Important is Leadership?   

One management author wrote, “forget leadership, strategy is all that matters.” Drucker’s research estimated that 50% of the success of any strategy in Implementation is due to leadership and the other 50% is due to everything else.

 

Ignoring the importance of leadership in strategy execution is a major mistake. Good plans are made and implemented under the guidance and direction of good leaders at all levels. A successful leader does not look at his or her planners for instructions. A successful leader looks at his or her planners and explains what he or she wants to do. Once the planners examine the feasibility, they develop options, alternatives, and recommendations to the leader, but the leader makes the final decisions and then returns it to the planners for the details of implementation.

       

We know that good planners can also be good leaders and top executives. Dwight Eisenhower was an unknown Army lieutenant colonel who had made a name for himself through his planning abilities though he had never commanded troops in actual combat. In 1940 General George C. Marshall, then Army Chief of Staff plucked Eisenhower from obscurity because of his planning abilities and made him a brigadier general, later selecting him for top allied commander In Europe. Eisenhower never held the rank of colonel, the rank between lieutenant colonel and brigadier general. He had never led troops in combat at any level. Eisenhower, however,  was a gifted leader. As Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, he led the largest sea-borne invasion in history and developed, and executed the overall strategy that was triumphant. He did all this while leading troops of many different countries, speaking different languages, with different priorities and politics as well as controlling great field commanders such as Patton and Montgomery.

 

 

 Business is not War, but There are Strategy Lessons to Consider

 

We don’t intentionally take human life in business, nor set out to destroy a competitor’s physical resources during competitive engagements. But while business, no matter how challenging, is not war, it is important not to ignore thousands of years of trial and error and innovation regarding any strategy because many of the general principles of strategy are the same.

 

 

The work of the thinkers and doers of strategy over the millennia, and in many cultures have resulted in these principles. These are general principles which are the same no matter where we apply them. Strategy lessons from all fields, are worth examining not only by specialists who develop strategies for a particular situation, but by leaders at every level who must think through proposed strategies for their organizations, make the overall decisions, and finally see them implemented under their direction.

 

 

References:

*Adapted from:

The Art of the Strategist by William A. Cohen (AMACOM, 2004)                 

The Art of the Strategist (audio version) by William A. Cohen (Harper Collins, forthcoming, 2023)

 


 


By Bo Yang Ph.D. January 31, 2026
Peter Drucker’s memoir, Adventures of a Bystander, is a self-portrait of a most unusual kind. It reveals its subject not through direct autobiography, but through a series of incisive portraits of the people he encountered throughout a tumultuous life. Drucker positions himself as a "bystander," but this is no passive observer. Instead, he is an intellectual portraitist whose careful study of others becomes the very method by which he comes to understand himself and the fractured world he inhabited. The book’s central drama is framed by a vivid scene from the summer of 1940. Karl Polanyi, a brilliant economic historian and refugee from the war engulfing Europe, was staying with the young Drucker and his family in Vermont. Tormented by the news of France's surrender and the bombing of London, Polanyi was consumed by an agonizing question: "Why did this European catastrophe happen?" Each morning, as soon as he heard Drucker's infant daughter stir in her crib, he would rush into her room and pour out his developing theories, testing his grand intellectual framework on the most innocent of listeners. This single image captures the profound urgency that animates the book. For both Polanyi and Drucker, understanding the collapse of European civilization was not an abstract academic exercise; it was an existential necessity. To explain his unique perspective, Drucker employs the metaphor of the "bystander" as the "fireman in the theater." In old European theaters, two firemen were required to be present for every performance. They did not participate in the play, yet their presence was integral to it. From their unique vantage point, they saw the stage differently than the actors or the audience. Drucker clarifies that this viewpoint is not a simple reflection of reality. As he puts it, this kind of "reflection is a prism rather than a mirror; it refracts." In observing the world, the bystander sees reality broken down into its constituent parts, and in that refraction, he inevitably sees himself. This analysis will follow Drucker’s prismatic gaze. We will first explore his diagnosis of a European elite intellectually trapped by the failed ideas of the 19th century. We will then examine the desperate search for an exit from this intellectual prison, as seen through his dialogues with other brilliant minds on the edge of the abyss. Finally, we will uncover the alternative vision Drucker discovered—not in a grand ideology, but in the pragmatic realities of American society and the nascent practice of management. 1 Trapped in the 19th Century: The Collapse of a Worldview To comprehend the rise of 20th-century totalitarianism, Peter Drucker believed one must first understand the intellectual and imaginative paralysis of the European elites who preceded it. His portraits of the men and women of his youth are not mere nostalgic sketches; they are forensic examinations of a worldview in collapse. The catastrophe that befell Europe, he argues, was not caused by a sudden invasion of barbarism, but by an internal failure—a vacuum created when the continent’s leading minds became prisoners of their own history, unable to see, let alone confront, the monstrous new reality taking shape before them. Drucker uses the haunting metaphor of a "sunken city of Atlantis" to describe the Vienna—and by extension, the Europe—of his youth. He recalls a childhood story of a city whose inhabitants, punished for their pride and greed, are forced to live as the undead, re-enacting their empty rituals in a world without sunlight. For Drucker, this was the state of the European elite. They were the living dead, trapped in the illusion of a "prewar" world, going through the motions of a life that no longer existed. This clinging to the past was, in his words, a "miasmic smog... paralyzing everybody," stifling all thought and imagination. The Paralysis of the Liberals The first and most prominent group of prisoners were the 19th-century liberals among whom Drucker was raised. His own father, a high-ranking government official, simply could not believe that Hitler would invade Austria or that another great war was possible. The editors at the prestigious journal The Austrian Economist, men of international perspective, dismissed 18-year-old Drucker’s warnings about the rising Nazi movement as "Nonsense," convinced that electoral politics had solved the problem. Most damningly, Drucker recounts an episode at the liberal-minded Frankfurt University. After a Nazi official delivered an ominous speech to the faculty, the university’s most celebrated professor—a brilliant scientist and archetypal liberal—was expected to offer a rebuttal. Instead, he stood up and asked only one question: "Could you please clarify... will the research budget for physiology be increased?"  For Drucker, the liberals' catastrophic failure was therefore not moral but imaginative—a cognitive paralysis rooted in their unwavering faith in a 19th-century framework that was utterly unequipped to recognize, let alone combat, a radically new form of political evil. They saw the Nazis as crude and vulgar, a temporary aberration that could be managed with the old tools, never imagining a world where their own cherished principles were no longer relevant. The Disillusionment of the Socialists If the liberals failed because they could not imagine a world beyond the 19th century, the socialists failed because their imagination was entirely a reaction against it, leaving them equally blind to the political realities of the 20th. They correctly diagnosed the deep flaws of the old order but were tragically naive in their proposed solutions. Drucker tells the story of Count Traun-Trauneck, a brilliant young aristocrat who placed his faith in an international workers' movement, believing the solidarity of the proletariat could transcend national borders and prevent the coming war. His hopes were brutally shattered when that very movement was consumed by a tidal wave of nationalism, as the "workers of the world" eagerly marched off to kill one another. The Count, his faith destroyed, retreated into obscurity, a broken man. Even more cautionary is the tale of Noel Brailsford, a British dissenter who journeyed from liberalism to socialism out of a deep compassion for the oppressed. Horrified by Nazism, Brailsford adopted the desperate logic of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend," which led him to become an apologist for Stalin's Soviet Union. He knew of the atrocities, yet out of a desire to preserve a united front against fascism, he publicly defended the indefensible. Drucker saw in Brailsford a terrible paradox: a good man whose conscience led him to "condone evil." It was a lesson in how well-intentioned idealism, when detached from political reality, can become both morally compromised and politically naive. The Cul-de-Sac of Rationalism Drucker identified a deeper intellectual prison that held both liberals and socialists captive: "Rationalism." He was careful to distinguish this from reason itself. For Drucker, Rationalism is the arrogant impulse to force the mysterious, non-rational dimensions of human life into a single, quasi-scientific, all-encompassing explanatory system, mistaking the map for the territory. His prime example of this mindset is Sigmund Freud. In a masterful chapter, Drucker deconstructs three central "myths" about Freud: that he was impoverished, held back by anti-Semitism, and professionally neglected. In reality, Drucker argues, Freud was a quintessential "child of the Enlightenment." His great project was to take the dark, mysterious depths of the human psyche—the subconscious—and force them into a neat, rationalist framework. He promised a single key, sexual repression, that could unlock every human mystery. This quest for a perfect, totalizing explanation, Drucker argues, was the true intellectual disease of the 19th century. This rationalist obsession with a single, perfect system was the poison that contaminated the wells of European thought. It created an intellectual environment where even the most brilliant minds, in their search for an escape, would propose new, equally totalizing solutions—be it the perfect statesman, the perfect social design, or the perfect technology. 2. The Search for a Way Out: Dialogues on the Edge of an Abyss Drucker did not diagnose Europe's crisis from a detached, academic distance. His search for an answer was a lived experience, forged in intense dialogue with other thinkers who were also desperately seeking a path beyond the failed ideologies of the 19th century. In the portraits of his intellectual interlocutors—Fritz Kraemer, Karl Polanyi, Buckminster Fuller, and Marshall McLuhan—Drucker reveals a landscape of brilliant but ultimately flawed attempts to find an exit. The 'Third German' and Legitimate Power Fritz Kraemer was an eccentric political philosopher who provocatively advocated for monarchy, not out of nostalgia, but from a deeply held conviction that to resist the illegitimate, mob-driven power of Nazism, Germany needed a true conservatism grounded in legitimate authority and political virtue. He called for a "third German"—an "ideal Prussian"—to stand against both the corrupt "ugly German" of the establishment and the weak, ineffective "good German" of the liberal class. Drucker shared Kraemer's belief that the legitimacy of power was the central question of modern politics. Yet he ultimately diverged from Kraemer's solution, seeing it as too narrowly focused on the power of the state and overly reliant on the emergence of a "great man" to solve society's problems. The Perfect Society and the Embedded Market Drucker’s relationship with Karl Polanyi was one of the most formative of his life. Polanyi’s quest for an exit from the 19th-century trap was part of a larger family drama; each of his four siblings also pursued a radical alternative, from fascism and engineering a new society in Brazil to rural sociology and philosophical personalism, illustrating the sheer desperation of the search. Karl’s path was economic history. In his masterwork, The Great Transformation, he argued that the worship of a utopian "free market" was the root of social decay and proposed a "third way" in which the market would be "embedded" within social principles. Drucker, however, saw in Polanyi’s quest another form of the 19th-century impulse for "salvation by society." Polanyi’s own historical research became a source of disillusionment; he discovered that the pre-market societies he idealized were often built on slavery and coercion. Their fundamental difference was captured in Polanyi’s friendly dismissal of Drucker’s emerging philosophy as a "tepid compromise." Polanyi was searching for the perfect society; Drucker was beginning to formulate a vision for a tolerable one. The American Prophets and the Gospel of Technology After moving to America, Drucker encountered two thinkers who offered a completely different exit: technology. He called Buckminster Fuller and Marshall McLuhan true "prophets" because they understood that technology was not merely a set of tools but a new, formative reality. Fuller preached a technological "pantheism," seeing it as divine harmony, while McLuhan famously viewed it as an "extension of man," altering human perception itself. Drucker recognized their genius but warned against idolizing technology as a new "Golden Calf." To understand their difference from Drucker, one might imagine technology as a lamp. Fuller was concerned with whether the lamp's light aligned with the cosmic order of the stars. McLuhan was fascinated by how the lamp's light fundamentally altered our eyesight and perception of the world. Drucker, however, insisted on asking: Who is holding the lamp? What is the human 'work' of carrying it? And what social responsibilities does that act entail? For Drucker, these brilliant searches—for the perfect statesman, the perfect society, or the perfect technology—all pointed to a deeper modern pathology. The quest for "salvation by society," he concluded, had turned society itself into an idol. "Society" had become the "Great Baal and Moloch of modern man," a false god to which people were willing to sacrifice themselves and others in the pursuit of a worldly paradise. This deification of the social, he believed, was the ultimate source of totalitarian temptation. His own path, therefore, would require not a new system, but a new humility. 3. The American Alternative: Society, Politics, and Management Drucker’s escape from the European intellectual labyrinth was not just theoretical; it was geographical and experiential. In the United States, he discovered a society that, while deeply flawed, offered a living, breathing alternative to the rigid and failed ideologies of Europe. It was not a perfect society, but a functioning one, and in its functioning, he found the raw materials for a new political and social vision. An Imperfect but Resilient Society Drucker was struck by the profound difference in how Americans and Europeans responded to the Great Depression. In Europe, the economic collapse bred "suspicion, surliness, fear, and envy," tearing the social fabric apart. In America, he observed, the Depression was largely viewed as a "natural disaster." This perception fostered solidarity; the community "closed ranks" rather than dissolving into class warfare. He identified a key source of this resilience in what he termed American "Tribalism." Contrary to Marxist predictions, the crisis did not produce a unified "proletariat." Instead, Americans fell back on their diverse religious and ethnic communities. Drucker acknowledged the dark side of this phenomenon, distinguishing between "discrimination against" others and "discrimination for" one's own group. Yet he argued that this flawed mechanism provided a powerful source of social cohesion that prevented total social collapse. This mosaic of particular communities was held together by an overarching "American Creed"—a set of abstract principles to which anyone could swear allegiance. A Politics of Pragmatism, Not Perfection This unique social structure was mirrored in what Drucker called "America's political genius": a rejection of the European obsession with ideological perfection. The core of this tradition was a concept he called "dualism": a refusal to separate the material from the ideal. For Americans, politics was neither a dirty game of power (Machiavelli) nor the deification of the state (Hegel). Instead, it was a moral and creative act of making "matter serve spirit"—using imperfect institutions to strive for ethical ends. This pragmatic approach, Drucker saw, reflected a kind of "pre-modern," community-based wisdom that Europe, in its obsession with grand "isms," had lost. The fierce debate between individualism and collectivism, for example, was resolved through a vibrant tradition of "voluntary group action," where citizens organized from the bottom up to solve problems. This focus on concrete, community-based action over abstract theory was the political equivalent of the practical wisdom he admired in the "pre-modern" figures of his youth. The Organization as the Locus of Freedom Drucker's political philosophy found its ultimate practical application in an unlikely place: the modern business corporation. A two-year study of General Motors in the 1940s crystallized his thinking. He found himself in a debate with GM's legendary chairman, Alfred Sloan, who held that a corporation's only responsibility was economic performance. Drucker argued for a broader vision: in a world where traditional communities were dissolving, the large corporation had become the central social institution. As such, it had to provide workers with the social status and function that the old order no longer could. He found an unexpected ally in GM's president, Charles E. Wilson, a self-proclaimed "socialist." Wilson championed two groundbreaking ideas: the employee pension fund, which Drucker predicted would make workers the owners of American industry, and the "self-governing plant community," a direct response to Drucker's call for granting workers more autonomy. From these observations, Drucker forged his most groundbreaking insight. Tyranny thrives in a vacuum of social status and function. The well-managed organization, therefore, is not just an economic entity; it is the primary non-governmental institution capable of providing individuals with the status, function, and community that prevent the alienation on which totalitarianism feeds. Management, understood correctly, was the concrete "alternative to tyranny." 4. The Enduring Mystery of the Person After a lifetime spent analyzing the grand ideologies that defined the 20th century, Peter Drucker’s ultimate answer to its crises lay not in a new system, but in a return to the irreducible and mysterious nature of the human person. The ideologies had failed because they were abstractions; they forgot the messy, contradictory reality of individual human beings. The way out was to recover a form of wisdom that looked unflinchingly at people as they are. The "Pre-Modern" Wisdom Drucker found this wisdom embodied not in great theorists, but in "pre-modern" figures. His grandmother dismissed complex economic theories with a simple analogy: a ruler cannot change its length and then claim people have grown taller. Confronted by a Nazi, she didn't argue ideology; she poked him with her umbrella and told him his swastika was as impolite as a pimple on his face—and he sheepishly removed it. Similarly, the dynamic salon hostess Genia Schwarzwald had a profound disdain for all "isms." Her passion was for solving concrete problems. As Drucker notes, her famous salon was not just a hub of intellectual life, but a compassionate "counter-world" she created as a refuge for the "old-time liberals" and other elites who felt trapped in the "sunken city" of a collapsing Europe. When a massive strike loomed, she forcefully intervened, knocking heads together. When accused of forcing both sides to betray their principles, she delivered a line that summarized her entire philosophy: "I have no use for principles which demand human sacrifice." Lessons from the "Men of Action" Drucker found further proof of this principle in the practical wisdom of the bankers and businessmen he met. The banker Ernest Freedberg insisted that any system must be "'foolproof,' because work is ultimately done by fools." The retail magnate Henry Bernheim taught him that "There are no irrational customers, only lazy merchants." Their insights were a constant reminder that effective action comes from observing people's actual behavior, not from imposing abstract models upon them. Drucker's Ultimate Insight Drucker’s entire intellectual journey was a movement toward this fundamental truth. As a young man, he had a startling religious insight: "The opposite of Sin... is not Virtue; it is Faith." Years later, while sitting in John Maynard Keynes's legendary economics seminar, he had a professional epiphany, realizing that everyone else in the room, including Keynes himself, was interested "in the behavior of commodities," whereas he was interested "in the behavior of people." This focus on the human person in all their complexity led him to his most profound conclusions. He came to see the problem of slavery in America not as a mere political mistake, but as a "sin"—a deep moral and spiritual wound that could only be healed by repentance and redemption. He was shaken to his core when a Black theologian argued that true freedom for Black Americans required confronting not only the sin of white oppression but also the "guilt and mystery" of their own African ancestors' role in the slave trade. For Peter Drucker, the bystander who had witnessed the collapse of a world, the most profound social and political problems were, at their root, moral and spiritual problems of the human heart. To escape the prisons of ideology, one must have the courage to set aside the quest for perfect systems and turn instead to the difficult, humbling, and ultimately liberating task of looking unflinchingly at the full, mysterious, and often contradictory nature of the person.
By Richard Johnson Ph.D. December 17, 2025
This essay was inspired by an article recently published by Karen Linkletter and Pooya Tabesh (2025). They were in search of the meaning of “decision” in the works of Peter Drucker. To this end, they used Python to identify and locate all the times the word, “decision”, came up in Peter Drucker’s oeuvre . They then characterized the contexts (“themes”) in which the word came up. The result was a nuanced but very clear characterization of the evolution of his thinking on the topic. Here, we will focus on a key theme for Drucker: the case where your decisions involve other people’s decisions and actions . For present purposes, we can start with their statement: One of Drucker’s valuable contributions to the literature on decision-making is his adamance that implementation be built into the decision-making process.” (Linkletter and Tabesh 2025 8) To be clear, “…it is not a surprise that his integration of implementation of and commitment to decisions is part of his process of decision-making. He argues that a decision “has not been made until it has been realized in action.” (2025 8) The question, therefore, is how to make this happen, how to turn an organization from an aggregate of individuals whose decisions may or may not be aligned, into an agent—an entity that makes decisions, implements them, and then ascertains that what was done was, in fact, what was decided, as we try to do when making purely individual decisions. Let’s look at the matter more closely… A few years ago, I read a story about a road crew that was painting a double-yellow line on a highway. In their path was a dead raccoon that had been hit by a car or truck. It was lying right in the middle of the road. The crew didn’t stop. Someone later took a picture of the dead raccoon with a double-yellow line freshly painted right over it. The picture is below. It went viral on the Internet.
By Robert Kirkland Ph.D. December 17, 2025
When Paul Polman became CEO of Unilever in 2009, he did not inherit a troubled company. He stepped into a large global enterprise with familiar consumer brands that sat on shelves in cities from Amsterdam to Manila. Even with that scale and reach, the business rested on foundations that were beginning to crack. Public faith in multinational firms was fading, climate change was moving from a distant worry to a financial reality, and investors were increasingly locked into the rhythm of quarterly results that encouraged short term decisions and discouraged real strategy. Polman’s answer was surprisingly philosophical for a leader of such a company. Rather than defend profitability as the central corporate purpose, he attempted to redefine what the company was for. His response may suggest a contemporary expression of Peter Drucker’s idea of Management as a Liberal Art. Drucker described management as a moral undertaking that must be anchored in judgment, responsibility, and service, not only in efficiency or cost control. Redefining Corporate Purpose Soon after taking the role, Polman stunned many investors by ending quarterly earnings guidance. He went further and encouraged investors who focused only on short term returns to place their money elsewhere (Polman and Winston, 2021). The gesture appears to have been meant to reset the company’s relationship with financial markets. Drucker consistently argued that true leadership cannot be tied to the emotional fluctuations of short term financial reporting. By refusing to follow the ninety day cycle, Polman gave Unilever enough breathing space to think about long term issues. He also sent a powerful message inside the company. Unilever would no longer place shareholder extraction above every other consideration. Drucker might say that Polman was returning management to a place where purpose and meaning had priority. Drucker had long argued that institutions must be run for durability and social legitimacy, not just for quarterly outcomes (Drucker, 1946). The Unilever Sustainable Living Plan In 2010, Polman introduced the Unilever Sustainable Living Plan, which attempted to grow the company while reducing its environmental footprint (Unilever, 2010). The plan contained measurable goals for carbon emissions, water use, waste, sustainable sourcing, health, hygiene, nutrition, and economic livelihoods in the supply chain (Unilever, 2018). This was not presented as charity. It was presented as the business model itself. This approach fits well with Drucker’s view that a company must justify its existence through contributions to the common good (Drucker, 1946). Polman noted that a company serving billions of consumers could not thrive in a world marked by climate disruption, fragile supply chains, and social instability (Polman and Winston, 2021). He reframed sustainability as a competitive requirement. There are many examples of how this mindset influenced operations, such as targeted efforts to stabilize incomes for small farming communities or reduce water dependency in detergent production. Drucker would likely describe this approach as a return to institutional citizenship, which is the idea that power involves obligation (Drucker, 1989 and 1993). Human Dignity in Management Drucker believed that effective management is inseparable from human dignity. He argued that organizations must offer people both identity and contribution (Drucker, 1946). Polman appeared to take this to heart. Under his leadership, Unilever pushed for higher wages, safer working conditions, and expanded training programs across its vast networks of suppliers and small scale producers (Unilever, 2018). He also shifted language in a revealing way. Polman preferred speaking about farmers and families rather than vendors and suppliers (Polman and Winston, 2021). This change hinted at a deeper moral view of business. It positioned Unilever as a partner invested in the stability of the people who provided its raw materials. That reading fits closely with the idea of management as a liberal art, which sees leadership as an act of stewardship for the growth of people, not just the supervision of tasks (Drucker, 1989). Climate Leadership and Ethical Risk Management Drucker warned that management cannot be reduced to engineering efficiency. Managing also requires wrestling with consequences (Drucker, 1990). Polman pressed Unilever to treat climate risk as a direct business issue. He connected environmental damage to cost volatility, to consumer trust, and to the company’s long term future. Under his leadership, Unilever accelerated its use of renewable energy, sustainable materials, lighter packaging, and lower water use in many products (Unilever, 2010 and 2018). Polman’s climate agenda blended science, logistics, ethics, psychology, and an understanding of global politics. Drucker described this type of synthesis as central to Management as a Liberal Art. Responsible executives, he argued, must integrate many forms of knowledge into decisions (Drucker, 1989 and 1993). Polman framed sustainability as fiduciary responsibility rather than philanthropy. His influence is still visible in the way many global firms now treat environmental commitments as strategy rather than charity. This framing closely reflects Drucker’s view that corporate social responsibility must be rooted in a firm’s core mission, capabilities, and day-to-day operations rather than treated as a separate act of goodwill. By embedding sustainability into Unilever’s strategy and value chain, Polman demonstrated Drucker’s argument that responsible management integrates social obligations into how the business competes and performs, allowing ethical action and profitability to reinforce rather than undermine one another. Reviving Stakeholder Capitalism Polman helped restore credibility to the idea of stakeholder capitalism. He insisted that corporations must serve employees, consumers, suppliers, communities, and the environment rather than focus only on investor returns (Polman and Winston, 2021). He also pushed Unilever to evaluate brand performance partly through its social or health impact (Unilever, 2018). Under this model, brand equity included moral equity. This aligns with Drucker’s view that corporate legitimacy must be earned and never assumed (Drucker, 1989). For Polman, consumer trust was a survival requirement. When customers believe that a firm contributes to a worsening world, the company risks losing not just reputation but also the permission to operate (Drucker, 1990). Moral Leadership and Institutional Courage Polman spoke in moral terms more openly than most executives. He frequently challenged governments that fell short on climate commitments and he encouraged other business leaders to adopt fair labor standards and responsible tax behavior (Polman and Winston, 2021). Drucker argued that real authority is moral before it is positional. Polman’s conduct fits that idea well (Drucker, 1989 and 1990).  Inside the company, Polman asked employees to see themselves as contributors to social improvement and not merely as managers of brands or operations (Unilever, 2010). This practice reflects MLA. Drucker believed that people should find meaning and contribution through their work, not only wages (Drucker, 1989). Performance, Profit, and Purpose Some critics argue that purpose oriented leadership reduces profitability. Polman countered this by pointing to performance. During his tenure, Unilever posted steady growth, especially in emerging markets, improved margins, and delivered strong long term returns (Unilever, 2018). He argued that long term value and social value reinforce one another (Polman and Winston, 2021). Drucker had long dismissed the idea that ethical leadership conflicts with economic effectiveness (Drucker, 1999). Even with strong performance, tension remained. Certain investors disliked the refusal to play the quarterly guidance game. Some environmental advocates believed Unilever could have moved faster on issues such as plastics. Drucker never said that Management as a Liberal Art would eliminate conflict. He said that it would give leaders a moral compass for navigating conflict in a transparent way (Drucker, 1989). Polman seemed to follow that guidance by making tradeoffs visible and by emphasizing choices that protected dignity, stability, and ecological viability (Drucker, 1990). Building a Network of Responsible Institutions After leaving Unilever, Polman co founded Imagine, an organization that works with senior executives to accelerate progress toward the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (Polman and Winston, 2021). This next step reinforces the idea that sustainability for Polman is a theory of governance rather than a branding strategy. Drucker believed that modern society relies on networks of responsible institutions. These include corporations, governments, and nonprofit organizations that understand their interdependence and act accordingly (Drucker, 1946 and 1993). Polman’s post CEO work attempts to strengthen that network. He is essentially trying to rebuild the trust and cooperation among institutions that Drucker warned could erode in a fragmented society (Drucker, 1999). The Legacy of a Modern Druckerian Paul Polman’s leadership at Unilever provides one of the clearest contemporary examples of Drucker’s idea of Management as a Liberal Art. He treated the corporation as a civic institution rather than a simple profit generator. He wove climate stability, labor dignity, and social inclusion into the core of strategic planning. He asked brands to earn moral legitimacy. He emphasized supply chains as human communities. He took personal risks by arguing that corporations hold responsibility for the future of the planet on which their operations depend (Polman and Winston, 2021). In Drucker’s language, Polman practiced stewardship. He demonstrated that management concerns human beings, the communities they inhabit, and the ecological systems that support them (Drucker, 1989 and 1990). In an era shaped by climate upheaval, inequality, and declining institutional trust, Polman shifted the central question. Instead of asking whether companies can afford to care, he asked whether they can survive if they refuse to care at all. References Drucker, P. F. (1946). The concept of the corporation. New York: The John Day Company. Drucker, P. F. (1989). The new realities: In government and politics, in economics and business, in society and world view. New York: Harper & Row. Drucker, P. F. (1990). Managing the non-profit organization: Practices and principles. New York: HarperBusiness. Drucker, P. F. (1993). Post-capitalist society. New York: HarperBusiness. Drucker, P. F. (1999). Management challenges for the 21st century. New York: HarperBusiness. Polman, P., & Winston, A. (2021). Net Positive: How courageous companies thrive by giving more than they take. Harvard Business Review Press. Unilever. (2010). Unilever Sustainable Living Plan. Unilever PLC. Unilever. (2018). Sustainable sourcing and livelihoods progress report. Unilever PLC. World Business Council for Sustainable Development. (2019). Business leadership for a net-zero economy.
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